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ABSTRACT 
We develop the Game-Theoretic ASW Mission Planner (G-TAMP), an 
operational-level planning aid for the tasking of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms 
to protect a high-value unit (HVU) from attack by hostile submarines (SSKs).  We first 
present a defender-attacker optimization model in which the defender tasks platforms to 
minimize the probability that the enemy can reach the HVU, while the enemy observes 
and reacts to these visible defenses by routing SSKs to maximize this probability.  A 
defender-attacker/defender (D-A/D) model then extends the first model by adding a final 
“defender stage” to task potentially “secret” platforms.  This model also prescribes the 
optimal sensor mode for platforms that can use passive sonar (for secrecy) or active sonar 
(for increased detection ranges), in effect, quantifying the value of secrecy for the 
defender.  Five scenarios illustrate the D-A/D model’s ability to “shape” the battle space 
to the defender’s advantage using visible platforms in the first stage, and then to exploit 
the secrecy of hidden platforms for maximum benefit.  Model instances are mixed-integer 
programs with up to 14,000 constraints and 12,000 variables.  In each case, an optimal or 
near-optimal search plan coordinates the actions of multiple, heterogeneous ASW 
platforms to protect an HVU from an intelligent enemy. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A modern diesel-electric submarine (SSK) employs air-independent propulsion 
and lethal, “smart” weapons such as wake-homing torpedoes and anti-ship cruise 
missiles.  Even a small country with a modest military force can purchase such an SSK 
from Russia or Germany for a relatively low price, and effectively challenge the U.S. 
Navy’s ability to control and project power from the sea. 
The U.S. Navy faces the possibility of conflict with an adversary armed with 
these SSKs.  For instance, Iran, under worldwide pressure to abandon its nuclear 
ambitions, has recently threatened to use its small, but capable, submarine force to close 
the Strait of Hormuz, through which passes 40 percent of the world’s oil.  And, in 
October 2006, a Chinese Song-class SSK surfaced within weapons range of the USS Kitty 
Hawk, proving that even an antiquated diesel submarine can pose a threat to a U.S. 
aircraft carrier. 
To counter this threat, the U.S. Navy employs surface, sub-surface, and airborne 
platforms to protect high-value units (HVUs) such as aircraft carriers from attack.  In 
order to detect hostile submarines, these platforms use acoustic technology, which 
includes active and passive sonar in the form of hull-mounted and towed arrays, air-
dropped sonobuoys, and dipping sonar, along with non-acoustic technology, such as 
periscope-detection radar and magnetic-anomaly detection. 
The U.S. Navy uses several planning systems to help employ its anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) platforms.  Systems such as the Sonar Tactical Decision Aid (STDA), 
ASW Screen Planner Tactical Decision Aid, and Active Sensor Performance Estimate 
Computer Tool (ASPECT) focus on tactical details only: they do not coordinate or 
optimize the actions of multiple platforms.  A fourth planning tool, the Operational Route 
Planner (ORP), attempts to optimize search-route planning with a heuristic, but models 
only a randomly behaving, “dumb” attacker.  None of these models prescribes an 
optimal, coordinated, defense plan to protect an HVU from attack by an enemy who 
intelligently reacts to our defensive preparations. 
 xviii
To address the obvious shortcomings of current ASW mission-planning tools, we 
propose a new “Game-Theoretic ASW Mission Planner” (G-TAMP) as an operational-
level planning aid for the pre-positioning of ASW platforms.  The goal is to suggest how 
an ASW Commander might optimally coordinate multiple, heterogeneous defenders to 
protect an HVU from one or many intelligent, hostile SSKs. 
Under reasonable assumptions, we express the enemy’s course of action as a 
mathematical optimization to minimize the probability of detection of his SSKs, and the 
defender’s course of action as an optimization to maximize the probability of detecting 
them.  The defender employs “visible” platforms easily observed by the enemy, such as 
surface ships and platforms using active sonar, and “secret” platforms such as friendly 
submarines using passive sonar. 
We first present a defender-attacker model (a two-stage Stackelberg game) in 
which the defender tasks platforms, and the enemy observes and reacts to these defenses; 
however, this model is appropriate only if all of the defender’s platforms are visible.  
Therefore, G-TAMP improves on this by using a defender-attacker/defender (D-A/D) 
model that adds a final “defender stage” to task secret platforms unknown to the enemy.  
When the defender possesses platforms that can choose to use passive sonar (for secrecy) 
or active sonar (for increased detection ranges), the model prescribes the optimal sensor 
mode, in effect quantifying the value of secrecy for the defender. 
The resulting mathematical model is a mixed integer linear program (MIP) that 
assigns each platform an area, time on station, and sensor mode.  This mathematical 
program can be solved by commercial optimization software using traditional techniques; 
we also present a decomposition that accelerates solution times. 
Five scenarios illustrate the power of our model.  In each case, an optimal or near-
optimal search plan coordinates the actions among each of the defender’s ASW 
platforms.  These scenarios illustrate G-TAMP’s ability to “shape” the battle space to our 
advantage using visible platforms in the model’s first stage, and then to exploit the 
secrecy of our hidden platforms as we “game” with the enemy in second stage.  
 xix
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I. INTRODUCTION  
This thesis develops a new, operational-level, mission-planning aid for anti-
submarine warfare.  This planning aid allows a battle group commander to optimally 
position and assign missions to his ASW platforms for protection of an aircraft carrier or 
other high-value units (HVUs) by maximizing the effectiveness of submarine search, 
while considering the enemy’s intelligent response to these defensive actions. 
This chapter explains how a modern submarine, in possession of an enemy 
willing to use it, poses a real threat to U.S. warships, and how the U.S. Navy plans to 
counter this threat.  The chapter also describes the deficiencies of current ASW mission-
planning tools, which helps to motivate the research described in this thesis. 
A. THE SUBMARINE THREAT 
1. The Modern Submarine 
Modern submarines, both nuclear and diesel-electric, pose a significant threat to 
the U.S. Navy and its ability to control and project power from the sea.  For over a 
century, the submarine has been the ideal asymmetric weapon with which a weaker navy 
can successfully challenge a powerful adversary, because a submarine’s inherent stealth 
gives it the unique ability to conduct surprise attacks and effectively evade counter-
detection.  Innovation has further tipped the scales in favor of the modern submarine, as 
new air-independent propulsion (AIP) technologies allow diesel-electric submarines 
(SSKs), which once had limited endurance, to remain submerged for weeks (Jane’s 
2005); Figure 1 illustrates some modern submarine technology. 
Additionally, advances in weapons systems have greatly enhanced the lethality of 
modern submarines: 
Modern sensors and weapons pose a grave threat to U.S. and friendly naval and merchant 
forces.  High-speed, wake-homing, and other advanced torpedoes are now available for 
open purchase.  Submarines can also be armed with anti-ship cruise missiles, which can 
be launched while the submarines are submerged, and they can plant naval mines…, 
which have damaged or sunk more U.S. Navy ships since the end of WWII than any 
other weapon (Task Force ASW 2005). 
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Figure 1.   Modern submarine technology 
The German-made 212A SSK (from Jane’s 2008a) employs a fuel cell for submerged 
propulsion, while other AIP boats use a Stirling closed-cycle diesel engine, shown right 
(from BAE 2007).  Either technology allows for up to 14 days of submerged operations at 
5 knots. 
As a result, even a single submarine possesses the stealth and firepower necessary to 
penetrate a battle group’s defenses and damage or sink a U.S. Navy warship. 
2. Submarine Forces of the World 
In recent years, submarines have become readily available to any country that 
desires a formidable naval force, as countries such as Russia and Germany have made 
submarine exports, equipped with the latest in AIP technology and smart weapons, 
available to the world market.  The modest cost of a Russian Kilo-class submarine ($200 
million each) allows many countries the opportunity to buy one of the quietest SSKs in 
existence.  Iran, for example, has purchased three Kilos, and China has purchased 12, 
eight of which were added in just a two-year period (Jane’s 2008b).  Table 1 outlines 
worldwide submarine inventories. 
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Table 1.   Countries with submarine forces 
More than 40 countries have submarines (after Benedict 2006), including several 
countries with large inventories.  (SSN, SSGN and SSBN denote nuclear fast-attack, 
guided-missile, and ballistic missile submarines, respectively.) 
3. Future Conflict 
The U.S. Navy faces the near-term possibility of conflict with an adversary armed 
with submarines.  Iran, for example, has recently announced the production of a new line 
of submarines, and Iran’s Defense Minister has proclaimed their intent to use these, along 
with their small, but capable, existing submarine force, to retaliate against any military 
attack by closing the Strait of Hormuz (Boston Globe 2008).  Considering Iran’s defiant 
pursuit of a nuclear program, and the fact that the Strait of Hormuz carries 40 percent of 
the world’s oil, the U.S. cannot afford to ignore this threat.  Holland (1991) explains the 
effect submarines would have:  “In a conflict with less than a superpower, public or 
political patience will run thin concerning losses or delays by submarines. The magnitude of 
the political catastrophe arising from the torpedoing of an aircraft carrier in a limited conflict 
can hardly be overestimated.” 
China demonstrated its underwater-warfare capabilities in October 2006, when a 
Song-class SSK surfaced within weapons range of the USS Kitty Hawk.  No weapons 
were fired, but this proves that even an antiquated diesel submarine can pose a threat to a 
U.S. aircraft carrier. 
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B. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE PLATFORMS AND SYSTEMS 
The U.S. Navy uses the ASW platforms described below to search for, detect, 
classify, track, and prosecute hostile submarines.  These platforms, when included in the 
battle group, provide protection for HVUs as directed by the Joint Maritime Component 
Commander or Area ASW Commander (see DOD 2006).  This thesis develops a 
planning aid for the operational employment of these platforms. 
1. Surface Platforms 
Surface ships such as the Ticonderoga-class cruiser, Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyer, and Perry-class frigate (see Figure 2) perform the bulk of ASW missions.  
These ships employ active sonar, which uses transmitted acoustic pulses and subsequent 
echo returns to localize contacts, and passive sonar, which relies only on listening.  Their 
sonar systems use both hull-mounted and towed-array sensors.  When part of an aircraft 
carrier battle group (CVBG), these platforms act as a protective “screen” for the carrier, a 
defensive perimeter that deters submarine attack by employing these sensor systems, 
weapons such as anti-submarine torpedoes, and countermeasures such as decoys and anti-
torpedo torpedoes. 
 
Figure 2.   ASW-capable surface platforms 
A frigate (USS Nicholas, FFG 47, left), guided-missile destroyer (USS Bainbridge, DDG 
96, top right), and cruiser (USS Normandy, CG 60, bottom right) are all capable of ASW 
search and prosecution (from Jane’s 2008c). 
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2. Airborne Platforms 
The U.S. Navy employs both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft for ASW; Figure 3 
shows two examples.  The SH-60 helicopter, operated from cruisers, destroyers, and 
frigates, can drop sonobuoys capable of active or passive operation, and can “dip sonar,” 
i.e., can lower a sonar sensor into the ocean on a cable.  The land-based P-3 airplane can 
deploy its sonobuoy inventory in various patterns to enhance search effectiveness, and is 
capable of extended echo ranging, which uses the sound from detonating small explosive 
charges to locate submarines.  In addition to sonar sensors, both the SH-60 and P-3 are 
equipped with surface-search periscope-detection radar that can detect and localize an 
exposed submarine periscope or mast.  Both platforms employ lightweight torpedoes for 
attacks.  The next-generation successor to the P-3, the P-8, deploys in 2013, and will 
improve upon the P-3’s capabilities, including the ability to control unmanned aerial 
vehicles for submarine search. 
 
Figure 3.   Airborne ASW platforms 
The SH-60 Seahawk helicoper (left) and P-3 Orion airplane (right) perform large-area 
ASW searches (from Jane’s 2008d). 
3. Sub-Surface Platforms 
A CVBG typically contains two fast-attack submarines that serve as sub-surface 
ASW platforms.  The Los Angeles, Seawolf, and Virginia classes of submarine (see 
Figure 4) are all equipped with active and passive, hull-mounted and towed-array sonar 
systems.  These submarines often provide the most effective sonar search capability due 
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to their low self noise, inherent stealth, and ability to vary search depth to capitalize on 
the ocean’s local acoustic conditions.  They are armed with long-range, wire-guided, 
heavyweight torpedoes for engaging enemy combatants. 
 
Figure 4.   Los Angeles-class submarine 
Each carrier battle group typically includes two fast-attack submarines for sub-surface 
ASW support, such as the Los Angeles-class submarine USS Asheville, SSN 758, shown 
here (from Jane’s 2008e). 
C. CURRENT PLANNING TOOLS 
The U.S. Navy currently employs several tools for planning ASW missions.  Each 
tool may succeed in its intended goal, but none optimally coordinates the actions of 
multiple ASW platforms to protect an HVU, and none considers an enemy’s intelligent 
response to our defensive preparations. 
1. Personal Computer-Based Interactive Multisensor Analysis Training 
System (PCIMAT) and Sonar Tactical Decision Aid (STDA) 
The Personal Computer-Based Interactive Multisensor Analysis Training System 
(PCIMAT), also known as the Sonar Tactical Decision Aid (STDA), is the premier ocean 
acoustic analysis and planning tool available on all ASW platforms, including surface 
ships, aircraft, and submarines.  The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
originally developed this system as a training tool, but it has since evolved into a tactical 
decision aid for ASW platforms.  Although employable from a laptop computer (as 
PCIMAT), the latest technology integrates its capabilities with a platform’s entire fire-
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control suite (and is then called STDA).  PCIMAT offers planners the ability to plan a 
sonar search based on measurements of the local ocean environment, or ocean conditions 
can be retrieved from a worldwide, historical database, downloaded in message traffic 
that uses up-to-date satellite imagery, or forecast for up to 48 hours in advance using the 
Navy’s new Global Navy Coastal Ocean Model (SPAWAR 2008). 
PCIMAT provides ocean temperature estimates, which affect sensor performance, 
as well as a visual representation of estimated sound propagation paths (i.e., “ray 
tracing”), which helps planners decide where to place sensors to enhance search 
effectiveness.  The newest version of PCIMAT adds a mission-planning module that 
analyzes the acoustic conditions at a user-designated geographic location and provides a 
graphical representation of a platform’s effective search range and its vulnerability to 
counter-detection by an enemy. 
2. ASW Screen Planner Tactical Decision Aid (TDA) 
The ASW Screen Planner Tactical Decision Aid (TDA) helps the ASW 
Commander to plan ASW screens.  The planner specifies a threat submarine (from a 
database) and assigns available ASW platforms to sectors surrounding the HVU, and the 
TDA calculates the probability of detecting the enemy submarine given that it transits a 
particular sector.  (A bearing spread and range window define each sector, for example, 
all bearings from 000 to 020 degrees at ranges between 10,000 and 20,000 yards.)  The 
planner then iteratively and manually assigns platforms to sectors until he creates a 
solution with an acceptable probability of detection (SWDG 2004). 
3. Active System Performance Estimate Computer Tool (ASPECT) 
The Active System Performance Estimate Computer Tool (ASPECT) aids P-3 
aircraft in maximizing the effectiveness of active sonobuoy search.  The planner 
manually specifies several sonobuoy patterns (such as a grid, circle, or “V” arrangement) 
and a ping rate (which determines how often and in what sequence each buoy transmits 
pings).  ASPECT then uses a Monte Carlo simulation to generate approximately 500 
random submarine tracks in the area to be searched, and simulates the entire mission for 
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each track and each sonobuoy pattern and ping rate combination.  The planner then 
chooses the solution with the highest probability of detection, which ASPECT estimates 
from the percentage of target tracks detected (FAST 2006). 
4. Operational Route Planner (ORP) 
The Operational Route Planner (ORP) models the “area search problem,” whose 
goal is to best route search platforms, at the tactical level, to detect an SSK that may be 
present in a designated geographic area.  ORP uses a genetic algorithm to provide 
heuristically optimized search plans for multiple ASW defenders.  The planner specifies 
available platforms and assigns patrol regions, and the solution provides detailed, 
coordinated track plans for the searchers.  ORP simulates the attacker’s actions using 
Monte Carlo simulation based on a probabilistic description of assumed enemy behavior 
and several user-selected rules (for example, the planner can specify that an SSK will 
change depth when it moves within a certain range of a defender) (Wagner Associates 
2008). 
 These four currently employed systems offer several different ways to plan ASW 
missions, but none provides a means of optimally and synergistically coordinating the 
actions of multiple, heterogeneous platforms at the operational level in an effort to protect 
an HVU.  Also, because these systems assume that the enemy ignores defensive 
preparations, or that he behaves randomly (or according to a simple set of rules), they 
cannot model a determined attacker who responds to our defenses with intelligent 
avoidance tactics. 
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II. THE GAME-THEORETIC ASW MISSION PLANNER MODEL 
To address the shortcomings of current ASW mission planning tools, we propose 
the Game-Theoretic ASW Mission Planner (G-TAMP), an operational-level planning aid 
for the coordinated mission tasking of heterogeneous ASW platforms in order to protect 
one, or more, designated HVUs from attack by hostile SSKs. 
This chapter develops two models for optimizing defense plans.  We first present 
a defender-attacker model (D-A) that has a “defender” locating ASW platforms to 
minimize the probability that an “attacker” reaches an HVU, while the attacker observes 
and responds to these preparations by routing his SSKs to maximize that probability.  
Having introduced the D-A model, we can more easily present the second model, which 
G-TAMP uses for its solutions:  a defender-attacker/defender model (D-A/D) that adds a 
final stage to optimize the actions of “secret” defensive platforms i.e., those using passive 
sonar that the enemy cannot observe. 
A. ASW TERMINOLOGY 
Throughout this section, terms in italic font define a formal model lexicon. 
1. Geography 
We divide the ocean into a Four-Whiskey (4W) grid, which the U.S. Navy 
commonly uses to partition the ocean and coordinate operations.  4W grids are stationary, 
and vary in cell size and overall dimension, depending on the region they cover; typical 
cell sizes range from 5 nm2 to 10 nm2.  A grid cell is denoted by index g .  Figure 5 
shows an example of a 6×6 4W grid. 
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Figure 5.   4W grid 
A 4W grid cell is identified by its row letter and column number, e.g., C3.  Each black 
cell with a white “x” is impassable; all other cells are traversable.  The boxed region 
denotes protected cells. 
Each traversable cell is a candidate location through which an enemy SSK can 
pass and in which we can search using friendly platforms; impassable cells, which 
represent land or shoal waters, do not allow passage or search.  We refer to each cell by 
an alpha-numeric row and column label, for example, “A1” is the cell in the upper left-
hand corner of the grid. 
A protected cell is a traversable cell from which an enemy SSK can conduct an 
attack on the HVU.  Therefore, ASW defenders must take positions outside of the 
protected cells in order to prevent SSKs from entering.  We assume that the HVU 
remains inside of the protected cells, for example, to support air operations.  While, in 
reality, the HVU moves around within the region of protected cells, we assume that the 
enemy can conduct an attack from any protected cell. 
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Each traversable cell g  is connected to each adjacent traversable cell g′  by a 
directed arc ( , )g g′  in a network model.  An arc represents a feasible move for an SSK in 
either the horizontal, vertical, or diagonal direction.  For example, in Figure 5, an SSK 
could move from cell B1 to cells A1, B2, C1, or C2, but not to A2. 
2. Measure of Effectiveness 
Each defensive platform has an effective range at which it can detect an enemy 
submarine.  Twice this range defines the platform’s sweep width, which represents the 
detection potential of the sensor.  The sweep width is twice this range because we assume 
the platform can make a detection equally well to its left and right.  An alternative 
definition of sweep width is the area under the lateral range function p(x) of the sensor, 
which is defined as “the probability that the target will be detected if its track relative to 
the searcher is a straight line infinitely long in both directions with closest point of 
approach x” (Washburn 2002, pg. 4-1). 
To quantify the effectiveness of our search, we assume, as does Washburn (2007), 
that each traversable cell requires a certain amount of time for a given platform to search 
completely.  A platform will search an area per unit time equal to its search speed times 
sweep width.  Therefore, we define coverage rate as the fraction of a cell searched per 
unit time: ( )( )sweep width speedr
cell area
= .  In reality, coverage rate depends on a platform’s 
sensor system performance and crew proficiency, as well as environmental factors such 
as a cell’s temperature distribution, sea state, sound-speed profile, bathymetry, sea-life 
concentration, shipping density, and ambient noise (see Urick 1983).  Coverage rate also 
varies with the choice of active or passive sensor mode; therefore, a coefficient psgr  
specifies the coverage rate for platform p as it searches with sensor mode s in cell g. 
The search pressure in a given cell is the amount of search effort applied to that 
cell, i.e., the sum over all platforms of the product of coverage rate and time spent 
searching in that cell.  Cells with “high pressures” are well-searched, and therefore 
unattractive to the enemy. 
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3. Enemy Course of Action 
An enemy SSK attempts to carry out an attack on the HVU by transiting from 
some location outside of the 4W grid to some protected cell, which is within weapons 
range of the HVU.  To model this, we assume that each SSK transit begins at an artificial 
start cell g + , i.e., a “super-source” that connects to all cells through which the SSK can 
enter the 4W grid, and we assume that each transit ends at an artificial terminal cell g − , 
i.e., a “super-sink” that connects from all protected cells. 
The attacker’s goal is to route his SSKs from g +  such that the probability that at 
least one SSK reaches g −  is maximized.  The attacker approximates this by planning 
routes for the SSKs that minimize total accumulated pressure along their paths, which 
equates to minimizing the expected number of detections (e.g., Washburn and Wood 
1995; see also Appendix A). 
4. Friendly Course of Action 
Each friendly ASW platform can search for enemy SSKs in cells to which it is 
assigned.  Platforms are subdivided into several types. 
Each visible platform is observable to the enemy.  Visible platforms include all 
surface ships, which are easily observed visually, acoustically, or by electronic 
surveillance measures, and any platform that employs active sonar, which an approaching 
SSK can easily detect.  Enemy SSKs react to the pressures exerted by visible platforms. 
A secret platform cannot be observed by the enemy.  Secret platforms include 
friendly submarines employing passive sonar and passive sonobuoys deployed by 
aircraft.  Enemy SSKs may know that a secret platform is present—for instance, a CVBG 
is normally supported by two submarines—but a secret platform’s exact location, and 
therefore the pressure it exerts, remains unknown to the enemy. 
Each flexible platform can decide whether to operate visibly or in secret.  If a 
flexible platform chooses a mission with an active sensor mode, it gains in sensor 
performance, but becomes visible.  Likewise, it can choose a passive sensor mode to hide 
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from the enemy, but it must accept a decrease in search effectiveness.  A flexible 
platform will always decide to become either visible or secret, but never both. 
Each tethered platform, such as a helicopter operated from a surface ship, must be 
able to return to its base platform; therefore, a tethered platform can perform missions 
only within its tether range. 
Each mission assigns a platform to a group of contiguous cells to be searched, a 
time to patrol each cell, and a sensor mode s to use (active or passive).  To ensure that a 
mission contains cells within reasonable proximity of each other, we view the 4W grid 
network as an undirected graph and require that the cells that make up a mission, along 
with connecting arcs, form a connected subgraph.  We then enumerate each subgraph 
containing up to n cells, where n is the maximum number of cells that a platform can 
realistically search over the mission time horizon.  Each such subgraph becomes a 
candidate mission if it meets the planner’s requirements with respect to platform speed, 
range, the overall length of the mission, and pre-designated area restrictions (for example, 
submarines typically are assigned to limited water space to prevent conflicts).  
The defender’s goal is to assign mission tasking to platforms in order to maximize 
the pressure along the enemy’s paths.  Appendix A shows how maximizing total pressure 
corresponds to maximizing the probability of detection of all SSKs that might be 
attacking the HVU. 
B. A DEFENDER-ATTACKER (D-A) MODEL, SCREEN 
We assume initially that the defender possesses only visible platforms.  We 
further assume that these platforms deploy before the attacker begins any attack, and that 
both attacker and defender have the same information available.   The attacker observes 
the pressures exerted over the entire mission time horizon, and then responds by routing 
his SSKs intelligently in order to minimize the accumulated pressure.  (This is not a time-
phased model, which would make sense only if we have some knowledge of when the 
attacker might begin an attack; we have no such knowledge.)  Because of the sequential 
actions, this is a type of two-stage Stackelberg game, which we represent as a defender-
attacker (D-A) model (Brown et al. 2006).  Typical solutions to this D-A model create a 
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“screen” of defensive platforms around the HVU, so we call this model SCREEN.  It 
provides a worst-case scenario in which the attacker knows our defensive plan 
completely.  A detailed description follows. 
1. Indices and Index Sets 
p P∈  defending platforms 
BASEp P P′ ∈ ⊆  set of base platforms for tethered platforms 
TETHp P P′′ ∈ ⊆  set of platforms that are tethered to another platform, where 
BASE TETHP P∩ = ∅  
( , ) TETHp p PP′ ′′ ∈  set defining each base and tethered platform pair 
m M∈  possible missions 
s S∈  sensor modes, with { } { }1 2, ,S s s active passive= ≡  
g G∈  4W grid cells 
psm M M∈ ⊆  missions platform p can perform with sensor mode s 
pmg G G∈ ⊆  cells patrolled by platform p when executing mission m 
( , )g g A′ ∈  adjacency list specifying allowed SSK moves from grid cell g to 
grid cell g′  
,g g+ −  artificial start cell and terminal cell for SSKs, respectively 
2. Data [Units] 
psgr  coverage rate of platform p using sensor mode s in grid cell g 
[ 1hr− ] 
pmtime  time on station for platform p when executing mission m [hr] 
SUBSn  number of attacker submarines [submarines] 
PLATSn  maximum number of platforms that can search a given cell 
[platforms] 
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m mrange ′ ′′  shortest straight-line distance between some cell in mission m′  
and some cell in mission m′′  [nm] 
_ ′′pteth range  maximum range tethered platform ′′p can travel from its base 
platform before beginning a mission [nm] 
u maximum number of SSKs that can traverse any arc ( , )g g A′ ∈  
[submarines] 
ptrans  time required for platform p to transit a grid cell [hr]  
3. Variables [Units, if applicable] 
ggY ′  expected number of SSKs that travel arc ( , )g g′  [submarines] 
pmsR  1 if platform p executes mission m using sensor mode s,              
0 otherwise  
pmsgX  time that platform p spends executing mission m using sensor 
mode s in grid cell g [hr] 
Note:  Bold roman letters represent vectors, e.g., Y, R, X. 
4. Generic Constraint Sets (described in detail subsequently) 
( , )∈R X RX  limits on employment of defensive platforms 
∈Y Y  routing constraints on the attacker 
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The attacker’s objective (a0) is to minimize the accumulated pressure along the 
paths of his SSKs as they travel towards the HVU.  Constraints (a1) enforce a balance of 
flow through each traversable cell, that is, each SSK entering a cell must leave that cell, 
except at g + and g − .  Constraints (a2) limit the number of SSKs that can traverse between 
two given cells.  Without these constraints, an optimal solution for the attacker might 
send all SSKs along the same path, which seems unlikely for a stealthy adversary who is 
attempting to maximize the probability that at least one of his SSKs reaches a protected 
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 17
6. Limits on Defender’s Actions 
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Together, constraints (d1) through (d7) form the defender’s feasible region ( , )∈R X RX . 
Constraints (d1) require that each platform choose a single mission; constraints 
(d2) require that each platform use only the available time on station for the chosen 
mission; constraints (d3) require that a platform spend at least the amount of time 
required to transit a cell in each cell of the chosen mission; constraints (d4) limit the 
number of platforms that can occupy a single grid cell; constraints (d5) require that each 
tethered platform choose a mission within the tether range of its base platform; 
constraints (d6) require binary decisions; and constraints (d7) enforce non-negativity of 
the time spent on station. 
7. Improvements to SCREEN 
SCREEN generally provides solutions that optimally place defensive platforms in 
cells immediately surrounding the protected region. As a result, defensive platforms do 
not patrol more distant cells at all, and so these distant cells receive zero pressure.  This 
implies that the attacker could choose an indirect path that meanders around the 4W grid 
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before moving towards a protected cell.  However, we wish to model an attacker that 
takes the shortest route possible, unless he can avoid high-pressure cells by taking a 
longer one.  This realistically approximates the behavior of a diesel-electric submarine, as 
the survival of an SSK during combat depends on its remaining battery life.  Therefore, 
we introduce the parameter battery, which adds a small pressure cost for every arc 
traversed by an SSK. 
Occasionally, the defender has multiple optimal solutions and SCREEN will 
recommend placing defending platforms farther out from the perimeter of protected cells 
than necessary.  In reality, a battle group commander wants to keep as many platforms as 
close to the HVU as possible for air defense considerations.  Therefore, we introduce a 
“tie-breaking” term to modify coverage rate, which reduces the coverage rates in more 
distant cells by a small amount. 
Our formulation then includes the following additional terms: 
battery battery penalty for traversing a single arc [pressure] 
gdist  distance from cell g to nearest protected cell [nm] 
d weighting factor for screen distance penalty [1 nm hr⋅ ] 
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The magnitude of battery is much less than the pressure in searched cells, so it 
induces no unreasonable behavior in the attacker’s solution; that is, if the attacker can 
circumvent the defender by taking a longer path, he will choose it; otherwise he takes the 




Likewise, because d is also a small number, the distance penalty produces no 
unreasonable defender behavior.  If the defender benefits from moving the screen away 
from the protected cells, he will do so; otherwise he places defenders as close to the 
protected cells as possible. 
For ease of exposition, we define  
( )psg psg gr r d dist′ ′ ′′ = − ⋅ . 





p P m M
s S g G
r X′ ′∈ ∈
∈ ∈′
′∑ . 
When we refer to pressure along an SSK path, that implies the sum 
|
,( , ) ps
pm
psg pmsg gg
p P m Mg g path
s S g G
battery r X Y′ ′ ′∈ ∈∈′
∈ ∈′
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟′+⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ . 




|( , ) |( , )
( )
[ ]










p P m Mg g A
s S g G
g
ggg g g
g g g A g g g A
g
ij g
battery r X Y a0
n g g













′ ′ ′∈ ∈∈′
∈ ∈′
′ ′∈ ∈′ ′ ′ ′
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟′+⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠













8. Conversion of SCREEN to a Mixed-Integer Program, SCREENMIP 
We can temporarily fix R and X, take the dual of the inner, minimizing linear 
program and then release R and X.  This creates a monolithic, mixed-integer linear 
program (MIP), SCREENMIP. 
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Given an optimal defense plan *X  from SCREENMIP, we can recover an optimal 
attacker solution by fixing *X  in SCREEN and solving the resulting linear program, 
which is a pure, totally unimodular, network model (e.g., Ahuja et al., 1993, pp. 448-
449); therefore, the solution obtained, *Y , will be integral. 
However, due to the nature of the screening solution, the attacker may have 
multiple optimal solutions, and recovering a single solution (falsely) implies that the 
defender knows the attacker’s path with certainty.  This may not create difficulties when 
the defender employs only visible platforms, but it could lead to incorrect results if we 
were to add a third, sequential-decision stage to model secret defensive platforms.  In 
particular, such a model might act as if the defender, in the third stage, knows the 
attacker’s exact path or paths: this is unreasonable.  To avoid this, we use a three-stage, 
game-theoretic model that incorporates both sequential and simultaneous play. 
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C. A DEFENDER-ATTACKER/DEFENDER (D-A/D) MODEL, SSCREEN 
The Stackelberg SCREEN model provides the ability to optimally and 
synergistically create a screen of pre-positioned ASW defenses around an HVU to deter 
an enemy attack, which is a significant improvement over existing planning tools.  
However, it assumes that the attacker observes all defensive preparations, and this may 
be too conservative for the defender. 
In addition to the visible platforms used in a screen, ASW planners can employ 
secret platforms whose positions are not known to the enemy.  Typically, when detecting 
quiet submarines operating on battery, an active sensor mode provides increased 
detection range and bearing resolution, but it also reveals the originating platform’s 
location.  By employing secret platforms that use passive sonar, can we leverage their 
secrecy to create a better solution?  To answer this question, we present the following 
three-stage model, SSCREEN. 
SSCREEN could be modeled as a defender-attacker-defender problem with strict 
sequential play, i.e., as a three-stage Stackelberg game: the maximizing defender would 
task his visible platforms in the first stage, the minimizing attacker would route his SSKs 
optimally in the second stage, and the maximizing defender would assign missions to his 
secret platforms based on the SSKs’ paths.  Such a model has been formulated and 
solved, but the solutions it yields are unrealistic.  In particular, if an SSK has only a 
single optimal path, then one or more secret defensive platforms will simply lie in wait 
and kill it with high probability.  But, if the SSK does not have the exact same view of 
the environment the attacker does, these secret defensive platforms may be avoided, 
simply by chance. 
The solution to this dilemma emerges naturally when one realizes that the attacker 
is likely to have some knowledge of the defender’s secret platforms.  For instance, a 
CVBG is normally supported by two submarines, and if the attacker cannot detect one or 
both, then he knows, with a high level of certainty, that one or two secret defensive 
platforms are in the vicinity.  As another example, suppose that the attacker has detected 
a P-3 aircraft in the vicinity of the CVBG, but detects no active sonobuoys that the P-3 
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might deploy.  He may reasonably conclude that the aircraft has secretly deployed some 
passive sonobuoys around the battle group. 
Therefore, the inner attacker/defender model in SSCREEN may be viewed as a 
two-person, zero-sum game (TPZSG) with simultaneous play: the attacker will need to 
randomize his attack strategy and the defender, in the last stage, will need to randomize 
the mission assignments for his secret platforms.  For this reason, we define SSCREEN 
as a defender-attacker/defender (D-A/D) model, where the hyphen indicates sequential 
play, and the forward slash indicates simultaneous play.  The random attack strategy will 
be influenced by the “deterministic” first stage of the model, but attack variables Y can 
now be viewed as representing (continuous) probabilities.  The defender’s third-stage 
variables Q will then define the probability that a secret defensive platform is assigned to 
a given mission, or a mixed strategy.  A detailed description of this model follows. 
1. Additional Indices and Index Sets 
VISP P⊆  set of defending platforms potentially visible to the attacker 
SECRETP P⊆  set of defending platforms effectively invisible to the 
attacker, where VIS SECRETP P∩ = ∅  
FLEXP P⊆  set of defending platforms that can choose to operate in an 
active or passive mode 
VIS VIS FLEXP P P+ = ∪  
SECRET SECRET FLEXP P P+ = ∪  
2. Additional Variables [Units] 
pmsQ  probability that platform SECRETp P∈  executes covert mission 
m using sensor mode s [probability] 
pmsgW  expected amount of time platform ∈ SECRETp P  spends 
executing covert mission m using sensor mode s in cell g [hr] 
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3. Generic Constraint Sets (described in detail 
subsequently) 
( , , )∈Q R X QRX  limits on employment of visible defensive platforms, 
including which flexible platforms will be used as secret ones 
( , )∈Q W QW  limits on employment of secret defensive platforms 
∈Y Y  routing constraints on the attacker 
4. Max-Min/Max Optimization of Pressure along Attacker’s Path 
Formulated as a tri-level integer linear program, the model takes the form 
( , , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( )max min max g gg
g g A
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As before, the defender pre-positions his visible platforms, and the attacker 
chooses the path of minimum pressure.  However, the defender now has the ability to 
position additional, secret platforms to increase the pressure along the defender’s path.  
We treat Q, W and Y as continuous, so that their values suggest mixed strategies. 
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5. Limits on Defender’s Visible Platforms 
The outer maximization problem has feasible region ( , , )∈Q R X QRX , which is 
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These constraints are essentially the same as in SCREEN, with the exception of 
constraints (d2΄), which require that each flexible platform selects either a single, active 
mission, or a mixed strategy of passive missions. 
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6. Limits on Defender’s Secret Platforms 
The inner maximization problem has feasible region ( , )∈Q W QW , which is 
defined by the following constraints: 
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Constraints (d10΄) through (d14΄) require the same of the secret platforms as their 
visible counterparts, with the exception that Q is now continuous. 
7. Conversion of SSCREEN to a MIP, SSCREENMIP 
Because the inner min-max model in SSCREEN forms a TPZSG with 
simultaneous play, the order of optimization can be reversed, so that the new problem 
becomes a max-max/min problem, as shown below. 
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where ( , )gf ′ W X is defined by (a3). 
Given an optimal defense plan ( , )* *R X  from SSCREENMIP, we can recover an 
optimal attacker solution by fixing the first-stage variables ( , )* *R X  in SSCREENMIP 
and solving the resulting linear program.  The resulting ( , )* *Q W  are an optimal mixed 
strategy for the defender’s secret platforms, and the dual variables to constraints (b1΄) 
represent a corresponding optimal mixed strategy for the attacker. 
In the case where the defender possesses only visible platforms, 
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and (a0΄) reduces to (a0), (b1΄) reduces to (b1), and QRX reduces to RX .  Therefore, 
SSCREEN and SCREEN are identical when the defender has only visible platforms. 
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8. Decomposition of SSCREENMIP 
SSCREENMIP can be difficult to solve using brute-force MIP techniques.  
Therefore, we decompose the optimization as follows. 
New Indices 
k K∈  decomposition iteration 
New Data 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,k k k kQ R W X  defender’s plans for iteration k 
ˆ kY  attacker’s plans for iteration k 
Yˆ  set containing attacker plans { }1ˆ ˆ,..., KY Y  
We define the attacker’s subproblem ˆ ˆ( , )AMIN W X  as 
min
( , )
|( , ) |( , )
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We define the defender’s master problem ˆ( )DMAX Y as 
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The complete decomposition algorithm follows: 
Algorithm MAXMIN 
Input:  Data for defender’s problem, optimality tolerance 0ε ≥ ; 
Output: ε-optimal SSCREEN defense plan ( , , , )* * * *Q R W X , and corresponding 
attacker course of action (COA) *Y ; 
1. Initialize best lower bound LBZ ← −∞ , best upper bound UBZ ←∞ , 
define the incumbent, null SSCREEN defense plan 1 1ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )←W X 0 0  
as the best found so far, set ˆ ←∅Y , and set iteration counter K ← 1; 
2. Subproblem: Solve subproblem ˆ ˆ( , )AMIN W X  to determine the 
optimal attacker’s COA ˆ KY  given defense plan ˆ ˆ( , )K KW X ; the bound 
on the associated objective is min ˆ ˆ( , )
K KZ W X ; 
3. If min ˆ ˆ( , )
K K
LBZ Z< W X , set min ˆ ˆ( , )K KLBZ Z← W X  and record 
improved incumbent SSCREEN defense plan ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )K K←* *W X W X ; 
4. If ( UB LBZ Z ε− ≤ ) go to End; 
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5. Master Problem:  Set { }ˆ ˆ ˆ K← ∪ YY Y and solve master problem 
ˆ( )DMAX Y  to determine an optimal defense plan ( )1 1ˆ ˆ,K K+ +W X .  The 
bound on the objective is max ˆ( )Z Y ; 
6. If  max ˆ( )UBZ Z> Y  set max ˆ( )UBZ Z← Y ; 
7. If  ( UB LBZ Z ε− ≤ ) go to End; 
8. Set K ← K +1 and go to step (2) (Subproblem); 
9. End:  Solve SSCREENMIP with fixed defense plan ( , )* *W X  to 
recover ( , )* *Q R .  Fix ( , )* *R X and again solve SSCREENMIP as a 
linear program; the dual variables to constraints (b1΄) correspond to 
the attacker’s optimal mixed strategy *Y .  Print “ ( , , , )* * * *Q R W X  is 
an ε-optimal SSCREEN defense plan, and *Y  is the attacker’s 
response to that plan,” and halt. 
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III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter demonstrates the capabilities of G-TAMP (SSCREEN, the D-A/D 
model) by applying the model to a set of realistic, although simple, scenarios.  All 4W 
grid geography and numerical values are hypothetical; the reader can reproduce any of 
our experiments from the data in Appendix B. 
For all scenarios, we assume the following:  (1) the active sensor mode always 
provides better performance than the passive sensor mode in each cell; (2) each platform 
has an assigned time of four hours on station; (3) each candidate mission consists of one, 
two, or three contiguous cells, and for each platform, we enumerate all possible missions; 
(4) all grid cells measure 5 nautical miles (nm) by 5 nm, or 25 nm2 in area; (5) when a 
helicopter is included in the scenario, it is tethered to its corresponding surface platform 
(e.g., Helo1 is tethered to Surf1) with a tether range of 10 nm; (6) the attacker employs a 
single SSK; (7) for probability of detection ( )DP  calculation, the SSK transits a searched 
cell in 1.5 hours at 4 knots.  These modeling assumptions can be modified easily, at the 
discretion of a planner. 
Using the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS 2008) with Cplex 11 
(ILOG 2007), a desktop personal computer with an Intel 3.73 GHz processor solves four 
of the five examples exactly in less than ten minutes; however, one example requires 13 
hours to solve to within a relative optimality gap of 5%.  The largest problem has 14,727 
constraints, 9,105 continuous variables, and 3,288 binary variables.  
A. EXAMPLE ONE:  BASIC SCENARIO 
The first scenario illustrates how SSCREEN recommends an intuitively 





Figure 6.   Basic scenario, 4W grid geography 
For this scenario, cells C3, C4, D3, and D4 (boxed) comprise the region of protected 
cells; cells A2, F5, and F6 are impassable. 
We assume the ocean to be non-homogeneous; Figure 7 depicts the coverage rate 




Figure 7.   Basic scenario, coverage rates 
Friendly platforms can search light-colored cells more easily than dark-colored cells. 







SSN1 Flexible  
Table 2.   Basic scenario, available platforms 
 
An optimal solution positions platforms as shown in Figure 8; Table 3 shows the optimal 
corresponding mission details.  Because the screen of defending platforms is only one cell wide, 
the objective value of 1.39 means that the attacker sends an SSK through exactly one cell that is 
searched 1.39 times by defending platforms over the mission’s time horizon (four hours).  This 
objective value corresponds to a conservatively computed DP  of 0.41; therefore, the attacker’s 
single SSK will be detected with this probability (see Appendix A). 
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Figure 8.   Basic scenario, defensive platform positions 
In this scenario, all defenders choose active sensor modes; they form a tight screen 
around the HVU.  Each defensive platform has a deterministic mission assignment to 
patrol a given set of cells. 
Surf1 active Surf2 active Surf3 active Helo1 active P31 active SSN1 active
Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time
D2 1.09 B4 1.23 C5 0.65 B2 1.60 B2 1.07 E3 0.70
E2 1.46 B5 1.75 D5 2.27 C2 2.06 B3 2.16 E4 2.13
E3 1.45 C5 1.03 E5 1.08 D2 0.33 B4 0.77 E5 1.17  
Table 3.   Basic scenario, defensive platform mission assignments 
A mission tells each platform where to search, for how long, and which sensor mode to 
use.  Here, each platform chooses to patrol three cells for the times shown (in hours).  
SSN1 chooses to use active sonar for increased sensor performance. 
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In this scenario, the defenders form a tight screen around the HVU so that the 
pressure in any cell adjacent to a protected cell is 1.39.  Therefore, no matter which path 
the attacker chooses, he encounters the same level of search effort and the same 
probability of detection.  Note that SSN1 chooses the active sensor mode, and the 
attacker therefore observes its location. 
B. EXAMPLE TWO:  SHORT-HANDED SCENARIO 
The second scenario demonstrates a simple case in which a defensive platform 
chooses to remain secret.  It makes use of the basic scenario geography and ocean 
environment shown in Figures 6 and 7, respectively. 
Here, the defender has only a single surface ship and submarine to protect the 
HVU (see Table 4). 
Platform Type
Surf1 Visible
SSN1 Flexible  
Table 4.   Short-handed scenario, available platforms 
 
The optimal solution positions platforms as shown in Figure 9; Table 5 
summarizes the search plan.  The solution provides an objective value of 0.33, or an 




Figure 9.   Short-handed scenario, defensive platform positions 
Because two platforms cannot patrol the entire perimeter of the protected region, SSN1 
remains secret, and chooses a mixed strategy to randomize its actions.  Each cell with a 
submarine icon potentially receives some pressure from SSN1. 
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Surf1 active SSN1 passive
Cell Time Prob 0.078 Prob 0.092
B2 0.76 B4 4.00 D2 3.30
B3 0.65 Prob 0.114 E2 0.70
C2 2.59 D5 4.00 Prob 0.080
Prob 0.079 B4 0.70
E3 4.00 B5 3.30
Prob 0.148 Prob 0.014
E5 4.00 E2 3.30
Prob 0.266 E3 0.70
E2 0.70 Prob 0.130
E3 0.70 B4 0.70
E4 2.60 B5 0.70
C5 2.60  
Table 5.   Short-handed scenario, defensive platform mission assignments 
Surf1, a visible platform, chooses a single mission as shown.  SSN1, a flexible platform, 
chooses to remain secret and therefore uses a mixed strategy that randomizes its actions.  
The table on the right shows the probability with which SSN1 should perform each 
mission. 
In this case, because we limit mission size to three cells, two platforms cannot 
possibly patrol the entire perimeter of the protected region.  If SSN1 chooses an visible 
mission, the attacker can observe the locations of both defenders, and take an unopposed 
route to the HVU.  Therefore, SSN1 remains secret, and randomizes its patrol plan to 
remain unpredictable to the attacker’s SSK(s).  The attacker likewise randomizes his 
actions to keep the defender guessing.  Figure 10 shows an optimal attacker course of 




Figure 10.   Short-handed scenario, attacker COA and coverage rates 
          (top and bottom, respectively) 
In the top figure, dark cells show the attacker’s preferred routes; the attacker avoids light 
cells.  The coverage rates are shown bottom for comparison.  Note how dark cells here 
(which are hard to search) correspond to dark cells above (the likely SSK routes). 
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We see that the attacker prefers to traverse cells with low coverage rates, despite 
the fact that each cell on the perimeter of the protected region has the same (expected 
value of) pressure of 0.33, or an approximate DP  of 0.12.  If the attacker chooses to 
transit an easily searchable cell, and the submarine chooses the same cell, the attacker 
accumulates a high pressure cost and will likely be detected.  Likewise, even though 
SSN1 spends a majority of its time patrolling hard-to-search cells, the attacker knows that 
he will be more difficult to detect, so prefers these paths. 
C. EXAMPLE THREE:  OCEAN-INFLUENCE SCENARIO 
The third scenario demonstrates how a non-homogeneous ocean environment 
creates a non-intuitive solution.  We again use the basic scenario geography of Figure 6, 
with the coverage rates shown in Figure 11.   The protected cells lie in a region of hard-
to-search cells resulting from, say, an ocean front or current.  The defender has the 
platforms listed in Table 6 with which to search. 
 
Figure 11.   Ocean-influence scenario, coverage rates 
The protected region is surrounded by cells with low coverage rates, as would be the case 
if the HVU took station near an ocean current (e.g., the Gulf Stream or Kuroshio) or near 








SSN1 Flexible  
Table 6.   Ocean-influence scenario, available platforms 
 
Figure 12 shows the optimal locations for each platform to search; Table 7 details 
the search plan, which provides an objective value of 0.67, or a DP of 0.22. 
 
Figure 12.   Ocean-influence scenario, defensive platform positions 
The ocean current forces a non-obvious solution.  Because cells C5 and D5 have low 
coverage rates, the screen moves outward to regions more easily searched.  SSN1 
chooses to operate in secret. 
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Surf1 active Surf2 active Surf3 active Helo1 active P31 active SSN1 passive
Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Prob 0.475
B2 0.96 E4 2.40 B5 2.61 E2 0.47 B3 0.30 B3 4.00
C2 1.05 E5 1.07 B6 0.70 E3 2.67 B4 3.05 Prob 0.037




E2 4.00  
Table 7.   Ocean-influence scenario, defensive platform mission assignments 
SSN1 chooses to remain secret, and most often searches cells with low coverage rates. 
The ocean environment leads to the screen expanding outward to regions more 
easily searched.  SSN1 remains passive in order to capitalize on its secrecy:  most of the 
time, it searches cells B3 and E2 to aid the other, active searchers, but it occasionally 
patrols D6, a cell with a high coverage rate, to deter the attacker. 
Figure 13 shows the attacker’s COA and the coverage rates for comparison.  Once 
again, we see that the attacker prefers to transit through hard-to-search cells.  The 
majority of his paths arrive from the top or bottom of the grid as he travels toward the 
HVU through the ocean current.  Even though the attacker observes no defender in cell 
D6, he usually avoids it, fearing that a secret platform has taken station in water with 




Figure 13.   Ocean-influence scenario, attacker COA and coverage rates 
                              (top and bottom, respectively) 
The attacker (top figure) prefers to route his SSK from the top and bottom of the grid, 
where it can take advantage of the poor search conditions (see bottom figure).  He usually 
avoids the apparently empty D6. 
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D. EXAMPLE FOUR:  MULTIPLE-HVU SCENARIO  
The fourth scenario demonstrates how planners can employ G-TAMP to 
optimally allocate ASW platforms among multiple aircraft carrier operating areas 
(CVOAs) within a single 4W grid.  The scenario makes use of the geography in Figure 
14; the coverage rates are shown in Figure 15.  Table 8 shows the platforms that the 
defender must allocate among the two, geographically separated, protected cells.  In 
addition to the tethers placed on Helo1 and Helo2, the defender prevents mutual 
interference between the submarines; SSN1 and SSN2 each have assigned admissible 
cells that the other cannot enter, as shown in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 14.   Multiple-HVU scenario, 4W grid geography 
The defender stations one HVU in each of two geographically separated, protected cells 
(F3, C6), and must allocate defensive platforms among them. 
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Figure 15.   Multiple-HVU scenario, coverage rates 
As before, the defender can easily search light-colored cells, while dark cells are harder 
to search.  The defender wisely places his CVOAs in easily searched water to facilitate 










SSN2 Secret  




Figure 16.   Multiple-HVU scenario, allowed cells for SSNs 
In order to prevent interference between the submarines, SSN1 must remain in its 
assigned area (dark-shaded cells), while SSN2 must stay in the light-shaded cells. 
Figure 17 shows the optimal placement of the platforms, and Table 9 shows the 
search plans, which provide an objective value of 1.76, or a DP  of 0.48.  SSN1, a flexible 
platform, chooses the active sensor mode.  SSN2, forced to remain secret, chooses a 
mixed strategy of missions.  Note that it is optimal to occasionally move SSN2 from one 
CVOA to the other, in order to keep the attacker guessing. 
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Figure 17.   Multiple-HVU scenario, defensive platform positions 
Four (three) visible platforms are uniquely assigned to the CVOA associated with cell F3 
(C6).  However, SSN2, a secret platform, performs a mission near F3 with probability 
0.108, and a mission near C6 with probability 0.892 (see Table 9). 
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Surf1 active Surf2 active Surf3 active Helo1 active Helo2 active P31 active SSN1 active
Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time
B7 1.51 E2 1.01 E2 1.12 C5 0.41 E4 0.80 B5 2.13 G2 0.70
C7 0.50 E3 1.89 F2 1.94 D5 1.88 F4 2.60 B6 0.12 G3 1.43
D7 1.99 E4 1.10 G2 0.94 D6 1.72 G4 0.60 C5 1.75 G4 1.87
SSN2 passive
Prob 0.313 Prob 0.108
C7 4.00 E4 4.00
Prob 0.557 Prob 0.022
B6 3.30 B7 4.00
B7 0.70  
Table 9.   Multiple-HVU scenario, defensive platform mission assignments 
The defender distributes his platforms among CVOAs.  SSN1 uses active sonar; SSN2 
remains secret with a mixed strategy that divides its time between CVOAs. 
 
E. EXAMPLE FIVE:  CHOKE-POINT SCENARIO 
In the fifth and last scenario, we assume that the attacker sends an SSK from the 
west (left) side of the grid, and that he must transit through a navigational choke-point.  
The defender, privy to intelligence or cuing from another source, wishes to prevent the 
attacker’s passage.  We model this by placing the protected region on the right side of the 
4W grid, as shown in Figure 18.  The defender employs the platforms in Table 10, and 




Figure 18.   Choke-point scenario, 4W grid geography 
The attacker sends an SSK through the choke-point from left to right.  The defender 




SSN1 Flexible  
Table 10.   Choke-point scenario, available platforms 
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Figure 19.   Choke-point scenario, coverage rates 
 
The defender locates his platforms optimally as shown in Figure 20, with mission 
details listed in Table 11.  Because the platforms search such a small area, this plan 
provides an objective value of 2.06, or a DP  of 0.54.  The platforms form a classic 
barrier patrol (Koopman 1980, pg. 196), but choose to search cells in the fourth column 
of the 4W grid, as those cells are easier to search. 
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Figure 20.   Choke-point scenario, defensive platform positions 
The defender’s platforms form a classic barrier patrol in easily searched water. 
 
Surf1 active Helo1 active SSN1 active
Cell Time Cell Time Cell Time
C4 1.61 D4 0.30 B4 2.35
D4 1.89 E4 3.70 C4 0.70
E4 0.50 D4 0.95  
Table 11.   Choke-point scenario, defensive platform mission assignments 
Sensor performance outweighs secrecy in this scenario, so SSN1 uses active sonar. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis has introduced a tri-level, defender-attacker/defender (D-A/D) model 
to prescribe optimal search plans for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms seeking to 
protect a high-value unit (HVU, e.g., an aircraft carrier) from an intelligent enemy.  In the 
model’s first stage, the defender assigns mission tasking to his visible platforms (i.e., 
search platforms that are easily observed by the enemy using visual, acoustic, or by 
electronic-surveillance means).  Given this information, then, the attacker and defender 
engage in a two-person, zero-sum, simultaneous-play game.  This game assumes the 
attacker interprets the ocean environment as we do and reacts to visible platforms, and 
that he correctly infers which secret platforms we employ.  (Secret platforms, which 
include submarines using passive sonar and aircraft deploying passive sonobuoys, benefit 
from their ability to hide from the enemy, but have limited detection ranges compared to 
visible platforms using active sonar.)  As would be expected in this game, the defender 
randomizes the tasking of his secret platforms, while the attacker randomizes his 
approach routes to the HVU.  This model, “G-TAMP,” quantifies the value of secrecy by 
directing “flexible” platforms to remain secret or become visible, as required by the 
situation.  In this way, the D-A/D model allows us to “shape” the battle space to our 
advantage with visible platforms in the first stage, and then exploit the secrecy of hidden 
platforms in the second stage. 
Our model does not aim to replace current planning tools; rather, it leverages their 
capabilities to plan a coordinated ASW search effort among multiple platforms at the 
operational level.  We propose integrating the capabilities of G-TAMP with the U.S. 
Navy’s Undersea Warfare Decision Support System, developed by the Naval Undersea 
Warfare Center, which includes the STDA analysis tool, which analyzes the ocean 
environment and provides the requisite coverage-rate data for G-TAMP, and the planning 
tool ORP, which could transform our operational scheme into detailed track plans for 
platforms at the tactical level. 
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G-TAMP solves realistically sized problems in minutes using commercial off-the-
shelf optimization (mixed-integer programming) software.  We have suggested a 
decomposition technique that can reduce this time considerably; further study is required.  
If nothing else, the decomposition constructively suggests how to develop a heuristic that 
solves these problems without the need for any commercial optimization software. This 
would shorten solution times, and allow deployment of the model on any laptop 
computer. 
We recommend further research into other applications for the D-A/D model.  
Because the ability to model an intelligent enemy and secret defenders plays an important 
role in ASW mission planning, we propose incorporating the D-A/D (or a similar model) 
into tactical-level decision aids such as ORP and ASW Screen Planner TDA. 
The D-A/D model may also provide insight into areas other than ASW mission 
planning, such as homeland defense, in which a defender hopes to shape the battle space 
to his advantage, and then mitigate the consequences of an attacker’s actions. 
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APPENDIX A:  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROBABILITY OF 
DETECTION AND PRESSURE 
G-TAMP provides defensive plans that maximize the accumulated pressure along 
all SSK paths.  Using notation from Chapter II, sections B and C, this appendix shows 
how this corresponds to minimizing the probability of non-detection of all SSKs.   
Suppose that an SSK i remains stationary in any cell that it visits for some amount 
of time it .  To calculate the probability of detection for this SSK in cell g′ , Dg iP ′ , we 
make the following assumptions:  (1) each of the defender’s platforms searches randomly 
within its assigned cells (this is a conservative assumption); (2) the pressure in cell g′  is 
exerted uniformly throughout the mission time horizon T (for example, after half of the 
mission time has elapsed, one-half of the final search pressure has been exerted in each 
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If we assume that Dg iP ′ is independent between cells, then the probability of detection for 
SSK i along an entire path, ( )DP i , is 
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where iA consists of all arcs traversed by the SSK.  
The defender desires to minimize the probability of non-detection of all SSKs, 
NDP , which, if we detect each submarine independently of the others, we can express as 
( ) ( , )






ii i g g A
tf TP P i e ′
= = ∈′
−= − =∏ ∏ ∏ W X . 
Minimizing NDP  is equivalent to minimizing the logarithm of NDP ,  
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Because we sum over the paths of all SSKs, minimizing the above equation is equivalent 
to maximizing 
( , )




∑ W X , 
where we assume each SSK spends the same amount of time t in each cell.  This is 
equivalent to maximizing the objective function in SSCREEN, (a0΄).  Therefore, 
minimizing the probability of non-detection of all SSKs corresponds to maximizing 
pressure along all SSK paths under simplifying assumptions.  We use this measure of 
effectiveness so that prescribed solutions protect an HVU from attack by a single, or 
many, hostile SSKs. 
Now, Washburn (2002, pp. 6-1 to 6-3) has shown how to improve this 
approximation.  Because each approaching SSK does not remain stationary, we include a 
“dynamic enhancement” factor, which accounts for the increased probability of detection 
presented by a moving target.  We use the previous assumptions, and the following:  (3) 
the speed of each SSK is known (this is reasonable if an SSK is operating on battery 
power, as it surely would if attempting to approach an HVU stealthily); (4) the amount of 
time required for the attacker to transit a searched cell, it , is constant (this is 
approximately true for the geometry of the 4W grid). 
Washburn presents a method for calculating a “dynamic enhancement” factor, the 
details of which will not be repeated here.  For a target and searcher moving at speeds U 
and V, respectively, Table 12 shows several values of the dynamic enhancement factor, 








Table 12.   Sample dynamic enhancement factor values 
This table shows the value of the dynamic enhancement factor for several target-searcher 
speed ratios.  A value of 1.27 means that a platform searching at a speed V for a target 
moving at the same speed achieves the same search performance as that platform 
searching at a speed of 1.27V for a stationary target (after Washburn 2002, pg. 6-3). 
The dynamic enhancement factor expresses the improvement in search 
performance when a platform searches for a moving target compared to a stationary 
target.  For example, for a target and searcher both moving at V knots, / 1U V = , so 
/ 1.27V V = .  Therefore, DP  would be the same for a searcher moving at a speed of 
1.27V knots searching for a stationary target as for a searcher and target both moving at a 
speed of V knots. 
Once we have assumed a speed for the target SSK, we modify the equation for 
coverage rate to account for dynamic enhancement: 
( )( )( / )psg p p
psg
g






where ( / ) pV V  is the dynamic enhancement factor for platform p.  By using this value 
for psgr , we obtain better approximations for probability of detection. 
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APPENDIX B:  SCENARIO DATA 
The reader can reproduce any of our experiments from the data here.  All 
distances are in nautical miles, all times are in hours, and all coverage rates are in 
1hours− . 
We use the following parameters in all examples:  






time pm 4 for all p ,m
SSK speed 4 kts




The remaining sets and data follow. 
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A. EXAMPLE ONE:  BASIC SCENARIO 
Sets
P VIS P SECRET P FLEX P BASE P TETH PP TETH G M M ps
Surf1 (empty) SSN1 Surf1 Helo1 Surf1.Helo1 g+ {m1,…,m214} {Surf1.m1.active,…,Surf1.m214.active}
Surf2 gA1 {Surf2.m1.active,…,Surf2.m214.active}






g+.gA1 gB2.gB3 gC2.gD3 gD3.gC4 gE3.gF3 gB2
g+.gA3 gB2.gC1 gC2.g- gD3.gD2 gE3.gF4 gB3
g+.gA4 gB2.gC2 gC3.gB2 gD3.gD4 gE3.g- gB4
g+.gA5 gB2.gC3 gC3.gB3 gD3.gE2 gE4.gD3 gB5
g+.gA6 gB2.g- gC3.gB4 gD3.gE3 gE4.gD4 gB6
g+.gB1 gB3.gA3 gC3.gC2 gD3.gE4 gE4.gD5 gC1
g+.gB6 gB3.gA4 gC3.gC4 gD4.gC3 gE4.gE3 gC2
g+.gC1 gB3.gB2 gC3.gD2 gD4.gC4 gE4.gE5 gC3 (protected)
g+.gC6 gB3.gB4 gC3.gD3 gD4.gC5 gE4.gF3 gC4 (protected)
g+.gD1 gB3.gC2 gC3.gD4 gD4.gD3 gE4.gF4 gC5
g+.gD6 gB3.gC3 gC4.gB3 gD4.gD5 gE4.g- gC6
g+.gE1 gB3.gC4 gC4.gB4 gD4.gE3 gE5.gD4 gD1
g+.gE6 gB3.g- gC4.gB5 gD4.gE4 gE5.gD5 gD2
g+.gF1 gB4.gA3 gC4.gC3 gD4.gE5 gE5.gD6 gD3 (protected)
g+.gF2 gB4.gA4 gC4.gC5 gD5.gC4 gE5.gE4 gD4 (protected)
g+.gF3 gB4.gA5 gC4.gD3 gD5.gC5 gE5.gE6 gD5
g+.gF4 gB4.gB3 gC4.gD4 gD5.gC6 gE5.gF4 gD6
gA1.gB1 gB4.gB5 gC4.gD5 gD5.gD4 gE5.g- gE1
gA1.gB2 gB4.gC3 gC5.gB4 gD5.gD6 gE6.gD5 gE2
gA2.gA1 gB4.gC4 gC5.gB5 gD5.gE4 gE6.gD6 gE3
gA2.gA3 gB4.gC5 gC5.gB6 gD5.gE5 gE6.gE5 gE4
gA2.gB1 gB4.g- gC5.gC4 gD5.gE6 gF1.gE1 gE5
gA2.gB2 gB5.gA4 gC5.gC6 gD5.g- gF1.gE2 gE6
gA2.gB3 gB5.gA5 gC5.gD4 gD6.gC5 gF1.gF2 gF1
gA3.gA4 gB5.gA6 gC5.gD5 gD6.gC6 gF2.gE1 gF2
gA3.gB2 gB5.gB4 gC5.gD6 gD6.gD5 gF2.gE2 gF3
gA3.gB3 gB5.gB6 gC5.g- gD6.gE5 gF2.gE3 gF4
gA3.gB4 gB5.gC4 gC6.gB5 gD6.gE6 gF2.gF1 gF5 (impassable)
gA4.gA3 gB5.gC5 gC6.gB6 gE1.gD1 gF2.gF3 gF6 (impassable)
gA4.gA5 gB5.gC6 gC6.gC5 gE1.gD2 gF3.gE2 g-
gA4.gB3 gB5.g- gC6.gD5 gE1.gE2 gF3.gE3
gA4.gB4 gB6.gA5 gC6.gD6 gE1.gF1 gF3.gE4
gA4.gB5 gB6.gA6 gD1.gC1 gE1.gF2 gF3.gF2
gA5.gA4 gB6.gB5 gD1.gC2 gE2.gD1 gF3.gF4
gA5.gA6 gB6.gC5 gD1.gD2 gE2.gD2 gF4.gE3
gA5.gB4 gB6.gC6 gD1.gE1 gE2.gD3 gF4.gE4
gA5.gB5 gC1.gB1 gD1.gE2 gE2.gE1 gF4.gE5
gA5.gB6 gC1.gB2 gD2.gC1 gE2.gE3 gF4.gF3
gA6.gA5 gC1.gC2 gD2.gC2 gE2.gF1 gF5.gE4
gA6.gB5 gC1.gD1 gD2.gC3 gE2.gF2 gF5.gE5
gA6.gB6 gC1.gD2 gD2.gD1 gE2.gF3 gF5.gE6
gB1.gA1 gC2.gB1 gD2.gD3 gE2.g- gF5.gF4
gB1.gB2 gC2.gB2 gD2.gE1 gE3.gD2 gF6.gE5
gB1.gC1 gC2.gB3 gD2.gE2 gE3.gD3 gF6.gE6
gB1.gC2 gC2.gC1 gD2.gE3 gE3.gD4
gB2.gA1 gC2.gC3 gD2.g- gE3.gE2
gB2.gA3 gC2.gD1 gD3.gC2 gE3.gE4
gB2.gB1 gC2.gD2 gD3.gC3 gE3.gF2  
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p.m1.gA1 p.m39.gC1 p.m61.gA4 p.m83.gE6 p.m99.gD2 p.m114.gC1
p.m2.gA3 p.m40.gB2 p.m62.gA4 p.m84.gF1 p.m99.gE2 p.m114.gC2
p.m3.gA4 p.m40.gC2 p.m62.gA5 p.m84.gF2 p.m100.gC3 p.m114.gC3
p.m4.gA5 p.m41.gB3 p.m63.gA5 p.m85.gF2 p.m100.gD3 p.m115.gC2
p.m5.gA6 p.m41.gC3 p.m63.gA6 p.m85.gF3 p.m100.gE3 p.m115.gC3
p.m6.gB1 p.m42.gB4 p.m64.gB1 p.m86.gF3 p.m101.gC4 p.m115.gC4
p.m7.gB2 p.m42.gC4 p.m64.gB2 p.m86.gF4 p.m101.gD4 p.m116.gC3
p.m8.gB3 p.m43.gB5 p.m65.gB2 p.m87.gA1 p.m101.gE4 p.m116.gC4
p.m9.gB4 p.m43.gC5 p.m65.gB3 p.m87.gB1 p.m102.gC5 p.m116.gC5
p.m10.gB5 p.m44.gB6 p.m66.gB3 p.m87.gC1 p.m102.gD5 p.m117.gC4
p.m11.gB6 p.m44.gC6 p.m66.gB4 p.m88.gA3 p.m102.gE5 p.m117.gC5
p.m12.gC1 p.m45.gC1 p.m67.gB4 p.m88.gB3 p.m103.gC6 p.m117.gC6
p.m13.gC2 p.m45.gD1 p.m67.gB5 p.m88.gC3 p.m103.gD6 p.m118.gD1
p.m14.gC3 p.m46.gC2 p.m68.gB5 p.m89.gA4 p.m103.gE6 p.m118.gD2
p.m15.gC4 p.m46.gD2 p.m68.gB6 p.m89.gB4 p.m104.gD1 p.m118.gD3
p.m16.gC5 p.m47.gC3 p.m69.gC1 p.m89.gC4 p.m104.gE1 p.m119.gD2
p.m17.gC6 p.m47.gD3 p.m69.gC2 p.m90.gA5 p.m104.gF1 p.m119.gD3
p.m18.gD1 p.m48.gC4 p.m70.gC2 p.m90.gB5 p.m105.gD2 p.m119.gD4
p.m19.gD2 p.m48.gD4 p.m70.gC3 p.m90.gC5 p.m105.gE2 p.m120.gD3
p.m20.gD3 p.m49.gC5 p.m71.gC3 p.m91.gA6 p.m105.gF2 p.m120.gD4
p.m21.gD4 p.m49.gD5 p.m71.gC4 p.m91.gB6 p.m106.gD3 p.m120.gD5
p.m22.gD5 p.m50.gC6 p.m72.gC4 p.m91.gC6 p.m106.gE3 p.m121.gD4
p.m23.gD6 p.m50.gD6 p.m72.gC5 p.m92.gB1 p.m106.gF3 p.m121.gD5
p.m24.gE1 p.m51.gD1 p.m73.gC5 p.m92.gC1 p.m107.gD4 p.m121.gD6
p.m25.gE2 p.m51.gE1 p.m73.gC6 p.m92.gD1 p.m107.gE4 p.m122.gE1
p.m26.gE3 p.m52.gD2 p.m74.gD1 p.m93.gB2 p.m107.gF4 p.m122.gE2
p.m27.gE4 p.m52.gE2 p.m74.gD2 p.m93.gC2 p.m108.gA3 p.m122.gE3
p.m28.gE5 p.m53.gD3 p.m75.gD2 p.m93.gD2 p.m108.gA4 p.m123.gE2
p.m29.gE6 p.m53.gE3 p.m75.gD3 p.m94.gB3 p.m108.gA5 p.m123.gE3
p.m30.gF1 p.m54.gD4 p.m76.gD3 p.m94.gC3 p.m109.gA4 p.m123.gE4
p.m31.gF2 p.m54.gE4 p.m76.gD4 p.m94.gD3 p.m109.gA5 p.m124.gE3
p.m32.gF3 p.m55.gD5 p.m77.gD4 p.m95.gB4 p.m109.gA6 p.m124.gE4
p.m33.gF4 p.m55.gE5 p.m77.gD5 p.m95.gC4 p.m110.gB1 p.m124.gE5
p.m34.gA1 p.m56.gD6 p.m78.gD5 p.m95.gD4 p.m110.gB2 p.m125.gE4
p.m34.gB1 p.m56.gE6 p.m78.gD6 p.m96.gB5 p.m110.gB3 p.m125.gE5
p.m35.gA3 p.m57.gE1 p.m79.gE1 p.m96.gC5 p.m111.gB2 p.m125.gE6
p.m35.gB3 p.m57.gF1 p.m79.gE2 p.m96.gD5 p.m111.gB3 p.m126.gF1
p.m36.gA4 p.m58.gE2 p.m80.gE2 p.m97.gB6 p.m111.gB4 p.m126.gF2
p.m36.gB4 p.m58.gF2 p.m80.gE3 p.m97.gC6 p.m112.gB3 p.m126.gF3
p.m37.gA5 p.m59.gE3 p.m81.gE3 p.m97.gD6 p.m112.gB4 p.m127.gF2
p.m37.gB5 p.m59.gF3 p.m81.gE4 p.m98.gC1 p.m112.gB5 p.m127.gF3
p.m38.gA6 p.m60.gE4 p.m82.gE4 p.m98.gD1 p.m113.gB4 p.m127.gF4
p.m38.gB6 p.m60.gF4 p.m82.gE5 p.m98.gE1 p.m113.gB5 p.m128.gA3
p.m39.gB1 p.m61.gA3 p.m83.gE5 p.m99.gC2 p.m113.gB6 p.m128.gA4
G pm  (for all p in P)
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p.m128.gB3 p.m143.gD4 p.m158.gB5 p.m172.gB3 p.m187.gD3 p.m202.gC1
p.m129.gA4 p.m143.gE3 p.m158.gC5 p.m173.gB3 p.m187.gE3 p.m202.gC2
p.m129.gA5 p.m144.gD4 p.m158.gC6 p.m173.gA4 p.m188.gE3 p.m202.gD2
p.m129.gB4 p.m144.gD5 p.m159.gC1 p.m173.gB4 p.m188.gD4 p.m203.gC2
p.m130.gA5 p.m144.gE4 p.m159.gD1 p.m174.gB4 p.m188.gE4 p.m203.gC3
p.m130.gA6 p.m145.gD5 p.m159.gD2 p.m174.gA5 p.m189.gE4 p.m203.gD3
p.m130.gB5 p.m145.gD6 p.m160.gC2 p.m174.gB5 p.m189.gD5 p.m204.gC3
p.m131.gB1 p.m145.gE5 p.m160.gD2 p.m175.gB5 p.m189.gE5 p.m204.gC4
p.m131.gB2 p.m146.gE1 p.m160.gD3 p.m175.gA6 p.m190.gE5 p.m204.gD4
p.m131.gC1 p.m146.gE2 p.m161.gC3 p.m175.gB6 p.m190.gD6 p.m205.gC4
p.m132.gB2 p.m146.gF1 p.m161.gD3 p.m176.gC1 p.m190.gE6 p.m205.gC5
p.m132.gB3 p.m147.gE2 p.m161.gD4 p.m176.gB2 p.m191.gF1 p.m205.gD5
p.m132.gC2 p.m147.gE3 p.m162.gC4 p.m176.gC2 p.m191.gE2 p.m206.gC5
p.m133.gB3 p.m147.gF2 p.m162.gD4 p.m177.gC2 p.m191.gF2 p.m206.gC6
p.m133.gB4 p.m148.gE3 p.m162.gD5 p.m177.gB3 p.m192.gF2 p.m206.gD6
p.m133.gC3 p.m148.gE4 p.m163.gC5 p.m177.gC3 p.m192.gE3 p.m207.gD1
p.m134.gB4 p.m148.gF3 p.m163.gD5 p.m178.gC3 p.m192.gF3 p.m207.gD2
p.m134.gB5 p.m149.gE4 p.m163.gD6 p.m178.gB4 p.m193.gF3 p.m207.gE2
p.m134.gC4 p.m149.gE5 p.m164.gD1 p.m178.gC4 p.m193.gE4 p.m208.gD2
p.m135.gB5 p.m149.gF4 p.m164.gE1 p.m179.gC4 p.m193.gF4 p.m208.gD3
p.m135.gB6 p.m150.gA1 p.m164.gE2 p.m179.gB5 p.m194.gA3 p.m208.gE3
p.m135.gC5 p.m150.gB1 p.m165.gD2 p.m179.gC5 p.m194.gA4 p.m209.gD3
p.m136.gC1 p.m150.gB2 p.m165.gE2 p.m180.gC5 p.m194.gB4 p.m209.gD4
p.m136.gC2 p.m151.gA3 p.m165.gE3 p.m180.gB6 p.m195.gA4 p.m209.gE4
p.m136.gD1 p.m151.gB3 p.m166.gD3 p.m180.gC6 p.m195.gA5 p.m210.gD4
p.m137.gC2 p.m151.gB4 p.m166.gE3 p.m181.gD1 p.m195.gB5 p.m210.gD5
p.m137.gC3 p.m152.gA4 p.m166.gE4 p.m181.gC2 p.m196.gA5 p.m210.gE5
p.m137.gD2 p.m152.gB4 p.m167.gD4 p.m181.gD2 p.m196.gA6 p.m211.gD5
p.m138.gC3 p.m152.gB5 p.m167.gE4 p.m182.gD2 p.m196.gB6 p.m211.gD6
p.m138.gC4 p.m153.gA5 p.m167.gE5 p.m182.gC3 p.m197.gB1 p.m211.gE6
p.m138.gD3 p.m153.gB5 p.m168.gD5 p.m182.gD3 p.m197.gB2 p.m212.gE1
p.m139.gC4 p.m153.gB6 p.m168.gE5 p.m183.gD3 p.m197.gC2 p.m212.gE2
p.m139.gC5 p.m154.gB1 p.m168.gE6 p.m183.gC4 p.m198.gB2 p.m212.gF2
p.m139.gD4 p.m154.gC1 p.m169.gE1 p.m183.gD4 p.m198.gB3 p.m213.gE2
p.m140.gC5 p.m154.gC2 p.m169.gF1 p.m184.gD4 p.m198.gC3 p.m213.gE3
p.m140.gC6 p.m155.gB2 p.m169.gF2 p.m184.gC5 p.m199.gB3 p.m213.gF3
p.m140.gD5 p.m155.gC2 p.m170.gE2 p.m184.gD5 p.m199.gB4 p.m214.gE3
p.m141.gD1 p.m155.gC3 p.m170.gF2 p.m185.gD5 p.m199.gC4 p.m214.gE4
p.m141.gD2 p.m156.gB3 p.m170.gF3 p.m185.gC6 p.m200.gB4 p.m214.gF4
p.m141.gE1 p.m156.gC3 p.m171.gE3 p.m185.gD6 p.m200.gB5
p.m142.gD2 p.m156.gC4 p.m171.gF3 p.m186.gE1 p.m200.gC5
p.m142.gD3 p.m157.gB4 p.m171.gF4 p.m186.gD2 p.m201.gB5
p.m142.gE2 p.m157.gC4 p.m172.gB2 p.m186.gE2 p.m201.gB6
p.m143.gD3 p.m157.gC5 p.m172.gA3 p.m187.gE2 p.m201.gC6
G pm  (for all p in P) (continued)
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Data
dist g teth_range p'' r psg
gA1  10.0 Helo1 10.0 Surf1.active Surf2.active Surf3.active Helo1.active P31.active SSN1.passive SSN1.active
gA2  10.0 gA1 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.5 0.55 0.45 0.63
gA3  10.0 trans p gA2 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.5 0.55 0.45 0.63
gA4  10.0 Surf1  0.5 gA3 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.67 0.73 0.6 0.84
gA5  10.0 Surf2  0.5 gA4 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.84 0.91 0.75 1.05
gA6  10.0 Surf3  0.5 gA5 0.91 0.91 0.91 1.09 1.18 0.97 1.36
gB1  10.0 Helo1  0.1 gA6 0.95 0.95 0.95 1.14 1.24 1.02 1.43
gB2  5.0 P31  0.1 gB1 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.5 0.55 0.45 0.63
gB3  5.0 SSN1  0.7 gB2 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.59 0.64 0.53 0.74
gB4  5.0 gB3 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.67 0.73 0.6 0.84
gB5  5.0 gB4 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.84 0.91 0.75 1.05
gB6  10.0 gB5 0.88 0.88 0.88 1.05 1.14 0.94 1.32
gC1  10.0 gB6 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.24 1.34 1.11 1.55
gC2  5.0 gC1 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.67 0.73 0.6 0.84
gC3  0.0 gC2 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.76 0.82 0.68 0.95
gC4  0.0 gC3 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.84 0.91 0.75 1.05
gC5  5.0 gC4 0.84 0.84 0.84 1.01 1.09 0.9 1.26
gC6  10.0 gC5 0.91 0.91 0.91 1.1 1.19 0.98 1.37
gD1  10.0 gC6 0.97 0.97 0.96 1.16 1.26 1.03 1.45
gD2  5.0 gD1 0.91 0.91 0.91 1.09 1.18 0.98 1.37
gD3  0.0 gD2 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.22 1.32 1.08 1.52
gD4  0.0 gD3 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.92 1 0.83 1.16
gD5  5.0 gD4 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.76 0.82 0.68 0.95
gD6  10.0 gD5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.84 0.91 0.75 1.05
gE1  10.0 gD6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.84 0.91 0.75 1.05
gE2  5.0 gE1 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.19 1.29 1.06 1.48
gE3  5.0 gE2 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.24 1.34 1.1 1.55
gE4  5.0 gE3 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.76 0.82 0.68 0.95
gE5  5.0 gE4 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.59 0.64 0.53 0.74
gE6  10.0 gE5 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.67 0.73 0.6 0.84
gF1  10.0 gE6 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.67 0.73 0.6 0.84
gF2  10.0 gF1 0.95 0.95 0.95 1.14 1.24 1.02 1.43
gF3  10.0 gF2 0.88 0.88 0.88 1.05 1.14 0.94 1.31
gF4  10.0 gF3 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.67 0.73 0.6 0.84
gF5  10.0 gF4 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.5 0.55 0.45 0.63
gF6  10.0 gF5 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.5 0.55 0.45 0.63
gF6 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.5 0.55 0.45 0.63
 64
range m'm''
Determined from table below
e.g., for range(m1, m128), take the minimum of the distances (gA1, gA3), (gA1, gA4), (gA1, gB3), which are 10, 15, 
        11.2, respectively.  Therefore, range(m1, m128) is 10.
 gA1  gA2  gA3  gA4  gA5  gA6  gB1  gB2  gB3  gB4  gB5  gB6  gC1  gC2  gC3  gC4  gC5  gC6
gA1 0 5 10 15 20 25 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9
gA2 5 0 5 10 15 20 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4
gA3 10 5 0 5 10 15 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18
gA4 15 10 5 0 5 10 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1
gA5 20 15 10 5 0 5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2
gA6 25 20 15 10 5 0 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10
gB1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 0 5 10 15 20 25 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5
gB2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 5 0 5 10 15 20 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6
gB3 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 10 5 0 5 10 15 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8
gB4 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15 10 5 0 5 10 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2
gB5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 20 15 10 5 0 5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1
gB6 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 25 20 15 10 5 0 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5
gC1 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 0 5 10 15 20 25
gC2 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 5 0 5 10 15 20
gC3 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 10 5 0 5 10 15
gC4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15 10 5 0 5 10
gC5 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 20 15 10 5 0 5
gC6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 25 20 15 10 5 0
gD1 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5
gD2 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6
gD3 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8
gD4 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2
gD5 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1
gD6 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5
gE1 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9
gE2 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4
gE3 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18
gE4 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1
gE5 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2
gE6 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10
gF1 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2
gF2 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25
gF3 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2
gF4 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18
gF5 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8
gF6 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15  
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range m'm'' (continued)
 gD1  gD2  gD3  gD4  gD5  gD6  gE1  gE2  gE3  gE4  gE5  gE6  gF1  gF2  gF3  gF4  gF5  gF6
gA1 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4
gA2 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32
gA3 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2
gA4 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9
gA5 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5
gA6 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25
gB1 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32
gB2 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3
gB3 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25
gB4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4
gB5 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6
gB6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20
gC1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2
gC2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25
gC3 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2
gC4 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18
gC5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8
gC6 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15
gD1 0 5 10 15 20 25 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9
gD2 5 0 5 10 15 20 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4
gD3 10 5 0 5 10 15 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18
gD4 15 10 5 0 5 10 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1
gD5 20 15 10 5 0 5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2
gD6 25 20 15 10 5 0 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10
gE1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 0 5 10 15 20 25 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5
gE2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 5 0 5 10 15 20 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6
gE3 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 10 5 0 5 10 15 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8
gE4 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15 10 5 0 5 10 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2
gE5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 20 15 10 5 0 5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1
gE6 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 25 20 15 10 5 0 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5
gF1 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 0 5 10 15 20 25
gF2 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 5 0 5 10 15 20
gF3 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 10 5 0 5 10 15
gF4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15 10 5 0 5 10
gF5 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 20 15 10 5 0 5
gF6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 25 20 15 10 5 0  
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B. EXAMPLE TWO:  SHORT-HANDED SCENARIO 
Sets
P VIS P SECRET P FLEX P BASE P TETH PP TETH M ps
Surf1 (empty) SSN1 (empty) (empty) (empty) {Surf1.m1.active,…,Surf1.m214.active}
{SSN1.m1.active,…,SSN1.m214.active}
These sets are identical to Example One:  {SSN1.m1.passive,…,SSN1.m214.passive}
A
G pm  
Data








gA1 0.42 0.45 0.63
gA2 0.42 0.45 0.63
gA3 0.56 0.6 0.84
gA4 0.7 0.75 1.05
gA5 0.91 0.97 1.36
gA6 0.95 1.02 1.43
gB1 0.42 0.45 0.63
gB2 0.49 0.53 0.74
gB3 0.56 0.6 0.84
gB4 0.7 0.75 1.05
gB5 0.88 0.94 1.32
gB6 1.03 1.11 1.55
gC1 0.56 0.6 0.84
gC2 0.63 0.68 0.95
gC3 0.7 0.75 1.05
gC4 0.84 0.9 1.26
gC5 0.91 0.98 1.37
gC6 0.97 1.03 1.45
gD1 0.91 0.98 1.37
gD2 1.01 1.08 1.52
gD3 0.77 0.83 1.16
gD4 0.63 0.68 0.95
gD5 0.7 0.75 1.05
gD6 0.7 0.75 1.05
gE1 0.99 1.06 1.48
gE2 1.03 1.1 1.55
gE3 0.63 0.68 0.95
gE4 0.49 0.53 0.74
gE5 0.56 0.6 0.84
gE6 0.56 0.6 0.84
gF1 0.95 1.02 1.43
gF2 0.88 0.94 1.31
gF3 0.56 0.6 0.84
gF4 0.42 0.45 0.63
gF5 0.42 0.45 0.63
gF6 0.42 0.45 0.63  
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C. EXAMPLE THREE:  OCEAN INFLUENCE SCENARIO 
Sets
All sets are identical to Example One.  
Data






Surf1.active Surf2.active Surf3.active Helo1.active P31.active SSN1.passive SSN1.active
gA1 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.84 0.91 0.75 1.05
gA2 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.68 1.82 1.5 2.1
gA3 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.59 0.64 0.53 0.74
gA4 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.36 0.3 0.42
gA5 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.36 0.3 0.42
gA6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.84 0.91 0.75 1.05
gB1 0.84 0.84 0.84 1.01 1.09 0.9 1.26
gB2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.92 1 0.83 1.16
gB3 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.42 0.46 0.38 0.53
gB4 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.31 0.26 0.36
gB5 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.36 0.3 0.42
gB6 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.34 1.46 1.2 1.68
gC1 0.84 0.84 0.84 1.01 1.09 0.9 1.26
gC2 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.76 0.82 0.68 0.95
gC3 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.59 0.64 0.53 0.74
gC4 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.36 0.3 0.42
gC5 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.21
gC6 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.34 1.46 1.2 1.68
gD1 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.84 0.91 0.75 1.05
gD2 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.5 0.55 0.45 0.63
gD3 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.36 0.3 0.42
gD4 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.36 0.3 0.42
gD5 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.42 0.46 0.38 0.53
gD6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.68 1.82 1.5 2.1
gE1 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.84 0.91 0.75 1.05
gE2 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.47 0.51 0.42 0.59
gE3 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.36 0.3 0.42
gE4 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.36 0.3 0.42
gE5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.84 0.91 0.75 1.05
gE6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.68 1.82 1.5 2.1
gF1 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.84 0.91 0.75 1.05
gF2 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.59 0.64 0.53 0.74
gF3 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.36 0.3 0.42
gF4 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.36 0.3 0.42
gF5 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.59 0.64 0.53 0.74
gF6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.68 1.82 1.5 2.1  
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D. EXAMPLE FOUR:  MULTIPLE HVU SCENARIO 
Sets
P VIS P SECRET P FLEX P BASE P TETH PP TETH
Surf1 SSN2 SSN1 Surf1 Helo1 Surf1.Helo1






g+ gE1 M M ps



































g+.gA1 gA7.gB7 gB7.gC8 gC7.gD7 gD7.gD8 gE7.gD7 gF7.gE6 gG6.gH6
g+.gA2 gA7.gB8 gB7.g- gC7.gD8 gD7.gE6 gE7.gD8 gF7.gE7 gG6.gH7
g+.gA3 gA8.gA7 gB8.gA7 gC7.g- gD7.gE7 gE7.gE6 gF7.gE8 gG7.gF6
g+.gA4 gA8.gB7 gB8.gA8 gC8.gB7 gD7.gE8 gE7.gE8 gF7.gF6 gG7.gF7
g+.gA5 gA8.gB8 gB8.gB7 gC8.gB8 gD7.g- gE7.gF6 gF7.gF8 gG7.gF8
g+.gA6 gB1.gA1 gB8.gC7 gC8.gC7 gD8.gC7 gE7.gF7 gF7.gG6 gG7.gG6
g+.gA7 gB1.gA2 gB8.gC8 gC8.gD7 gD8.gC8 gE7.gF8 gF7.gG7 gG7.gG8
g+.gA8 gB1.gB2 gC1.gB1 gC8.gD8 gD8.gD7 gE8.gD7 gF7.gG8 gG7.gH6
g+.gB1 gB1.gC1 gC1.gB2 gD1.gC1 gD8.gE7 gE8.gD8 gF8.gE7 gG7.gH7
g+.gB8 gB1.gC2 gC1.gC2 gD1.gC2 gD8.gE8 gE8.gE7 gF8.gE8 gG7.gH8
g+.gC1 gB2.gA1 gC1.gD1 gD1.gD2 gE1.gD1 gE8.gF7 gF8.gF7 gG8.gF7
g+.gC8 gB2.gA2 gC1.gD2 gD1.gE1 gE1.gD2 gE8.gF8 gF8.gG7 gG8.gF8
g+.gD1 gB2.gA3 gC2.gB1 gD1.gE2 gE1.gE2 gF1.gE1 gF8.gG8 gG8.gG7
g+.gD8 gB2.gB1 gC2.gB2 gD2.gC1 gE1.gF1 gF1.gE2 gG1.gF1 gG8.gH7
g+.gE1 gB2.gB3 gC2.gB3 gD2.gC2 gE1.gF2 gF1.gF2 gG1.gF2 gG8.gH8
g+.gE8 gB2.gC1 gC2.gC1 gD2.gC3 gE2.gD1 gF1.gG1 gG1.gG2 gH1.gG1
g+.gF1 gB2.gC2 gC2.gC3 gD2.gD1 gE2.gD2 gF1.gG2 gG1.gH1 gH1.gG2
g+.gF8 gB2.gC3 gC2.gD1 gD2.gD3 gE2.gD3 gF2.gE1 gG1.gH2 gH1.gH2
g+.gG1 gB3.gA2 gC2.gD2 gD2.gE1 gE2.gE1 gF2.gE2 gG2.gF1 gH2.gG1
g+.gG8 gB3.gA3 gC2.gD3 gD2.gE2 gE2.gE3 gF2.gE3 gG2.gF2 gH2.gG2
g+.gH1 gB3.gA4 gC3.gB2 gD2.gE3 gE2.gF1 gF2.gF1 gG2.gF3 gH2.gG3
g+.gH2 gB3.gB2 gC3.gB3 gD3.gC2 gE2.gF2 gF2.gF3 gG2.gG1 gH2.gH1
g+.gH3 gB3.gB4 gC3.gB4 gD3.gC3 gE2.gF3 gF2.gG1 gG2.gG3 gH2.gH3
g+.gH4 gB3.gC2 gC3.gC2 gD3.gC4 gE2.g- gF2.gG2 gG2.gH1 gH3.gG2
g+.gH5 gB3.gC3 gC3.gC4 gD3.gD2 gE3.gD2 gF2.gG3 gG2.gH2 gH3.gG3
g+.gH6 gB3.gC4 gC3.gD2 gD3.gD4 gE3.gD3 gF2.g- gG2.gH3 gH3.gG4
g+.gH7 gB4.gA3 gC3.gD3 gD3.gE2 gE3.gD4 gF3.gE2 gG2.g- gH3.gH2
g+.gH8 gB4.gA4 gC3.gD4 gD3.gE3 gE3.gE2 gF3.gE3 gG3.gF2 gH3.gH4
gA1.gA2 gB4.gA5 gC4.gB3 gD3.gE4 gE3.gE4 gF3.gE4 gG3.gF3 gH4.gG3
gA1.gB1 gB4.gB3 gC4.gB4 gD4.gC3 gE3.gF2 gF3.gF2 gG3.gF4 gH4.gG4
gA1.gB2 gB4.gB5 gC4.gB5 gD4.gC4 gE3.gF3 gF3.gF4 gG3.gG2 gH4.gG5
gA2.gA1 gB4.gC3 gC4.gC3 gD4.gC5 gE3.gF4 gF3.gG2 gG3.gG4 gH4.gH3
gA2.gA3 gB4.gC4 gC4.gC5 gD4.gD3 gE3.g- gF3.gG3 gG3.gH2 gH4.gH5
gA2.gB1 gB4.gC5 gC4.gD3 gD4.gD5 gE4.gD3 gF3.gG4 gG3.gH3 gH5.gG4
gA2.gB2 gB5.gA4 gC4.gD4 gD4.gE3 gE4.gD4 gF4.gE3 gG3.gH4 gH5.gG5
gA2.gB3 gB5.gA5 gC4.gD5 gD4.gE4 gE4.gD5 gF4.gE4 gG3.g- gH5.gG6
gA3.gA2 gB5.gA6 gC5.gB4 gD4.gE5 gE4.gE3 gF4.gE5 gG4.gF3 gH5.gH4
gA3.gA4 gB5.gB4 gC5.gB5 gD5.gC4 gE4.gE5 gF4.gF3 gG4.gF4 gH5.gH6
gA3.gB2 gB5.gB6 gC5.gB6 gD5.gC5 gE4.gF3 gF4.gF5 gG4.gF5 gH6.gG5
gA3.gB3 gB5.gC4 gC5.gC4 gD5.gC6 gE4.gF4 gF4.gG3 gG4.gG3 gH6.gG6
gA3.gB4 gB5.gC5 gC5.gC6 gD5.gD4 gE4.gF5 gF4.gG4 gG4.gG5 gH6.gG7
gA4.gA3 gB5.gC6 gC5.gD4 gD5.gD6 gE4.g- gF4.gG5 gG4.gH3 gH6.gH5
gA4.gA5 gB5.g- gC5.gD5 gD5.gE4 gE5.gD4 gF4.g- gG4.gH4 gH6.gH7
gA4.gB3 gB6.gA5 gC5.gD6 gD5.gE5 gE5.gD5 gF5.gE4 gG4.gH5 gH7.gG6
gA4.gB4 gB6.gA6 gC5.g- gD5.gE6 gE5.gD6 gF5.gE5 gG4.g- gH7.gG7
gA4.gB5 gB6.gA7 gC6.gB5 gD5.g- gE5.gE4 gF5.gE6 gG5.gF4 gH7.gG8
gA5.gA4 gB6.gB5 gC6.gB6 gD6.gC5 gE5.gE6 gF5.gF4 gG5.gF5 gH7.gH6
gA5.gA6 gB6.gB7 gC6.gB7 gD6.gC6 gE5.gF4 gF5.gF6 gG5.gF6 gH7.gH8
gA5.gB4 gB6.gC5 gC6.gC5 gD6.gC7 gE5.gF5 gF5.gG4 gG5.gG4 gH8.gG7
gA5.gB5 gB6.gC6 gC6.gC7 gD6.gD5 gE5.gF6 gF5.gG5 gG5.gG6 gH8.gG8
gA5.gB6 gB6.gC7 gC6.gD5 gD6.gD7 gE6.gD5 gF5.gG6 gG5.gH4 gH8.gH7
gA6.gA5 gB6.g- gC6.gD6 gD6.gE5 gE6.gD6 gF6.gE5 gG5.gH5
gA6.gA7 gB7.gA6 gC6.gD7 gD6.gE6 gE6.gD7 gF6.gE6 gG5.gH6
gA6.gB5 gB7.gA7 gC7.gB6 gD6.gE7 gE6.gE5 gF6.gE7 gG6.gF5
gA6.gB6 gB7.gA8 gC7.gB7 gD6.g- gE6.gE7 gF6.gF5 gG6.gF6
gA6.gB7 gB7.gB6 gC7.gB8 gD7.gC6 gE6.gF5 gF6.gF7 gG6.gF7
gA7.gA6 gB7.gB8 gC7.gC6 gD7.gC7 gE6.gF6 gF6.gG5 gG6.gG5
gA7.gA8 gB7.gC6 gC7.gC8 gD7.gC8 gE6.gF7 gF6.gG6 gG6.gG7
gA7.gB6 gB7.gC7 gC7.gD6 gD7.gD6 gE7.gD6 gF6.gG7 gG6.gH5  
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p.m1.gA1 p.m51.gG3 p.m83.gC3 p.m108.gF4 p.m133.gB6 p.m158.gF3
p.m2.gA2 p.m52.gG4 p.m83.gD3 p.m108.gG4 p.m133.gB7 p.m158.gF4
p.m3.gA3 p.m53.gG5 p.m84.gC4 p.m109.gF5 p.m134.gB7 p.m159.gF4
p.m4.gA4 p.m54.gG6 p.m84.gD4 p.m109.gG5 p.m134.gB8 p.m159.gF5
p.m5.gA5 p.m55.gG7 p.m85.gC5 p.m110.gF6 p.m135.gC1 p.m160.gF5
p.m6.gA6 p.m56.gG8 p.m85.gD5 p.m110.gG6 p.m135.gC2 p.m160.gF6
p.m7.gA7 p.m57.gH1 p.m86.gC6 p.m111.gF7 p.m136.gC2 p.m161.gF6
p.m8.gA8 p.m58.gH2 p.m86.gD6 p.m111.gG7 p.m136.gC3 p.m161.gF7
p.m9.gB1 p.m59.gH3 p.m87.gC7 p.m112.gF8 p.m137.gC3 p.m162.gF7
p.m10.gB2 p.m60.gH4 p.m87.gD7 p.m112.gG8 p.m137.gC4 p.m162.gF8
p.m11.gB3 p.m61.gH5 p.m88.gC8 p.m113.gG1 p.m138.gC4 p.m163.gG1
p.m12.gB4 p.m62.gH6 p.m88.gD8 p.m113.gH1 p.m138.gC5 p.m163.gG2
p.m13.gB5 p.m63.gH7 p.m89.gD1 p.m114.gG2 p.m139.gC5 p.m164.gG2
p.m14.gB6 p.m64.gH8 p.m89.gE1 p.m114.gH2 p.m139.gC6 p.m164.gG3
p.m15.gB7 p.m65.gA1 p.m90.gD2 p.m115.gG3 p.m140.gC6 p.m165.gG3
p.m16.gB8 p.m65.gB1 p.m90.gE2 p.m115.gH3 p.m140.gC7 p.m165.gG4
p.m17.gC1 p.m66.gA2 p.m91.gD3 p.m116.gG4 p.m141.gC7 p.m166.gG4
p.m18.gC2 p.m66.gB2 p.m91.gE3 p.m116.gH4 p.m141.gC8 p.m166.gG5
p.m19.gC3 p.m67.gA3 p.m92.gD4 p.m117.gG5 p.m142.gD1 p.m167.gG5
p.m20.gC4 p.m67.gB3 p.m92.gE4 p.m117.gH5 p.m142.gD2 p.m167.gG6
p.m21.gC5 p.m68.gA4 p.m93.gD5 p.m118.gG6 p.m143.gD2 p.m168.gG6
p.m22.gC6 p.m68.gB4 p.m93.gE5 p.m118.gH6 p.m143.gD3 p.m168.gG7
p.m23.gC7 p.m69.gA5 p.m94.gD6 p.m119.gG7 p.m144.gD3 p.m169.gG7
p.m24.gC8 p.m69.gB5 p.m94.gE6 p.m119.gH7 p.m144.gD4 p.m169.gG8
p.m25.gD1 p.m70.gA6 p.m95.gD7 p.m120.gG8 p.m145.gD4 p.m170.gH1
p.m26.gD2 p.m70.gB6 p.m95.gE7 p.m120.gH8 p.m145.gD5 p.m170.gH2
p.m27.gD3 p.m71.gA7 p.m96.gD8 p.m121.gA1 p.m146.gD5 p.m171.gH2
p.m28.gD4 p.m71.gB7 p.m96.gE8 p.m121.gA2 p.m146.gD6 p.m171.gH3
p.m29.gD5 p.m72.gA8 p.m97.gE1 p.m122.gA2 p.m147.gD6 p.m172.gH3
p.m30.gD6 p.m72.gB8 p.m97.gF1 p.m122.gA3 p.m147.gD7 p.m172.gH4
p.m31.gD7 p.m73.gB1 p.m98.gE2 p.m123.gA3 p.m148.gD7 p.m173.gH4
p.m32.gD8 p.m73.gC1 p.m98.gF2 p.m123.gA4 p.m148.gD8 p.m173.gH5
p.m33.gE1 p.m74.gB2 p.m99.gE3 p.m124.gA4 p.m149.gE1 p.m174.gH5
p.m34.gE2 p.m74.gC2 p.m99.gF3 p.m124.gA5 p.m149.gE2 p.m174.gH6
p.m35.gE3 p.m75.gB3 p.m100.gE4 p.m125.gA5 p.m150.gE2 p.m175.gH6
p.m36.gE4 p.m75.gC3 p.m100.gF4 p.m125.gA6 p.m150.gE3 p.m175.gH7
p.m37.gE5 p.m76.gB4 p.m101.gE5 p.m126.gA6 p.m151.gE3 p.m176.gH7
p.m38.gE6 p.m76.gC4 p.m101.gF5 p.m126.gA7 p.m151.gE4 p.m176.gH8
p.m39.gE7 p.m77.gB5 p.m102.gE6 p.m127.gA7 p.m152.gE4 p.m177.gA1
p.m40.gE8 p.m77.gC5 p.m102.gF6 p.m127.gA8 p.m152.gE5 p.m177.gB1
p.m41.gF1 p.m78.gB6 p.m103.gE7 p.m128.gB1 p.m153.gE5 p.m177.gC1
p.m42.gF2 p.m78.gC6 p.m103.gF7 p.m128.gB2 p.m153.gE6 p.m178.gA2
p.m43.gF3 p.m79.gB7 p.m104.gE8 p.m129.gB2 p.m154.gE6 p.m178.gB2
p.m44.gF4 p.m79.gC7 p.m104.gF8 p.m129.gB3 p.m154.gE7 p.m178.gC2
p.m45.gF5 p.m80.gB8 p.m105.gF1 p.m130.gB3 p.m155.gE7 p.m179.gA3
p.m46.gF6 p.m80.gC8 p.m105.gG1 p.m130.gB4 p.m155.gE8 p.m179.gB3
p.m47.gF7 p.m81.gC1 p.m106.gF2 p.m131.gB4 p.m156.gF1 p.m179.gC3
p.m48.gF8 p.m81.gD1 p.m106.gG2 p.m131.gB5 p.m156.gF2 p.m180.gA4
p.m49.gG1 p.m82.gC2 p.m107.gF3 p.m132.gB5 p.m157.gF2 p.m180.gB4
p.m50.gG2 p.m82.gD2 p.m107.gG3 p.m132.gB6 p.m157.gF3 p.m180.gC4
G pm  (for all p except SSN1 and SSN2)
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p.m181.gA5 p.m197.gE5 p.m214.gF6 p.m231.gB1 p.m247.gD7 p.m264.gG5
p.m181.gB5 p.m198.gC6 p.m214.gG6 p.m231.gB2 p.m248.gD6 p.m264.gG6
p.m181.gC5 p.m198.gD6 p.m215.gE7 p.m231.gB3 p.m248.gD7 p.m265.gG5
p.m182.gA6 p.m198.gE6 p.m215.gF7 p.m232.gB2 p.m248.gD8 p.m265.gG6
p.m182.gB6 p.m199.gC7 p.m215.gG7 p.m232.gB3 p.m249.gE1 p.m265.gG7
p.m182.gC6 p.m199.gD7 p.m216.gE8 p.m232.gB4 p.m249.gE2 p.m266.gG6
p.m183.gA7 p.m199.gE7 p.m216.gF8 p.m233.gB3 p.m249.gE3 p.m266.gG7
p.m183.gB7 p.m200.gC8 p.m216.gG8 p.m233.gB4 p.m250.gE2 p.m266.gG8
p.m183.gC7 p.m200.gD8 p.m217.gF1 p.m233.gB5 p.m250.gE3 p.m267.gH1
p.m184.gA8 p.m200.gE8 p.m217.gG1 p.m234.gB4 p.m250.gE4 p.m267.gH2
p.m184.gB8 p.m201.gD1 p.m217.gH1 p.m234.gB5 p.m251.gE3 p.m267.gH3
p.m184.gC8 p.m201.gE1 p.m218.gF2 p.m234.gB6 p.m251.gE4 p.m268.gH2
p.m185.gB1 p.m201.gF1 p.m218.gG2 p.m235.gB5 p.m251.gE5 p.m268.gH3
p.m185.gC1 p.m202.gD2 p.m218.gH2 p.m235.gB6 p.m252.gE4 p.m268.gH4
p.m185.gD1 p.m202.gE2 p.m219.gF3 p.m235.gB7 p.m252.gE5 p.m269.gH3
p.m186.gB2 p.m202.gF2 p.m219.gG3 p.m236.gB6 p.m252.gE6 p.m269.gH4
p.m186.gC2 p.m203.gD3 p.m219.gH3 p.m236.gB7 p.m253.gE5 p.m269.gH5
p.m186.gD2 p.m203.gE3 p.m220.gF4 p.m236.gB8 p.m253.gE6 p.m270.gH4
p.m187.gB3 p.m203.gF3 p.m220.gG4 p.m237.gC1 p.m253.gE7 p.m270.gH5
p.m187.gC3 p.m204.gD4 p.m220.gH4 p.m237.gC2 p.m254.gE6 p.m270.gH6
p.m187.gD3 p.m204.gE4 p.m221.gF5 p.m237.gC3 p.m254.gE7 p.m271.gH5
p.m188.gB4 p.m204.gF4 p.m221.gG5 p.m238.gC2 p.m254.gE8 p.m271.gH6
p.m188.gC4 p.m205.gD5 p.m221.gH5 p.m238.gC3 p.m255.gF1 p.m271.gH7
p.m188.gD4 p.m205.gE5 p.m222.gF6 p.m238.gC4 p.m255.gF2 p.m272.gH6
p.m189.gB5 p.m205.gF5 p.m222.gG6 p.m239.gC3 p.m255.gF3 p.m272.gH7
p.m189.gC5 p.m206.gD6 p.m222.gH6 p.m239.gC4 p.m256.gF2 p.m272.gH8
p.m189.gD5 p.m206.gE6 p.m223.gF7 p.m239.gC5 p.m256.gF3 p.m273.gA1
p.m190.gB6 p.m206.gF6 p.m223.gG7 p.m240.gC4 p.m256.gF4 p.m273.gA2
p.m190.gC6 p.m207.gD7 p.m223.gH7 p.m240.gC5 p.m257.gF3 p.m273.gB1
p.m190.gD6 p.m207.gE7 p.m224.gF8 p.m240.gC6 p.m257.gF4 p.m274.gA2
p.m191.gB7 p.m207.gF7 p.m224.gG8 p.m241.gC5 p.m257.gF5 p.m274.gA3
p.m191.gC7 p.m208.gD8 p.m224.gH8 p.m241.gC6 p.m258.gF4 p.m274.gB2
p.m191.gD7 p.m208.gE8 p.m225.gA1 p.m241.gC7 p.m258.gF5 p.m275.gA3
p.m192.gB8 p.m208.gF8 p.m225.gA2 p.m242.gC6 p.m258.gF6 p.m275.gA4
p.m192.gC8 p.m209.gE1 p.m225.gA3 p.m242.gC7 p.m259.gF5 p.m275.gB3
p.m192.gD8 p.m209.gF1 p.m226.gA2 p.m242.gC8 p.m259.gF6 p.m276.gA4
p.m193.gC1 p.m209.gG1 p.m226.gA3 p.m243.gD1 p.m259.gF7 p.m276.gA5
p.m193.gD1 p.m210.gE2 p.m226.gA4 p.m243.gD2 p.m260.gF6 p.m276.gB4
p.m193.gE1 p.m210.gF2 p.m227.gA3 p.m243.gD3 p.m260.gF7 p.m277.gA5
p.m194.gC2 p.m210.gG2 p.m227.gA4 p.m244.gD2 p.m260.gF8 p.m277.gA6
p.m194.gD2 p.m211.gE3 p.m227.gA5 p.m244.gD3 p.m261.gG1 p.m277.gB5
p.m194.gE2 p.m211.gF3 p.m228.gA4 p.m244.gD4 p.m261.gG2 p.m278.gA6
p.m195.gC3 p.m211.gG3 p.m228.gA5 p.m245.gD3 p.m261.gG3 p.m278.gA7
p.m195.gD3 p.m212.gE4 p.m228.gA6 p.m245.gD4 p.m262.gG2 p.m278.gB6
p.m195.gE3 p.m212.gF4 p.m229.gA5 p.m245.gD5 p.m262.gG3 p.m279.gA7
p.m196.gC4 p.m212.gG4 p.m229.gA6 p.m246.gD4 p.m262.gG4 p.m279.gA8
p.m196.gD4 p.m213.gE5 p.m229.gA7 p.m246.gD5 p.m263.gG3 p.m279.gB7
p.m196.gE4 p.m213.gF5 p.m230.gA6 p.m246.gD6 p.m263.gG4 p.m280.gB1
p.m197.gC5 p.m213.gG5 p.m230.gA7 p.m247.gD5 p.m263.gG5 p.m280.gB2
p.m197.gD5 p.m214.gE6 p.m230.gA8 p.m247.gD6 p.m264.gG4 p.m280.gC1
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p.m281.gB2 p.m297.gE4 p.m314.gF8 p.m331.gB3 p.m347.gE6 p.m364.gH1
p.m281.gB3 p.m298.gD5 p.m314.gG7 p.m331.gC3 p.m348.gD6 p.m364.gH2
p.m281.gC2 p.m298.gD6 p.m315.gG1 p.m331.gC4 p.m348.gE6 p.m365.gG2
p.m282.gB3 p.m298.gE5 p.m315.gG2 p.m332.gB4 p.m348.gE7 p.m365.gH2
p.m282.gB4 p.m299.gD6 p.m315.gH1 p.m332.gC4 p.m349.gD7 p.m365.gH3
p.m282.gC3 p.m299.gD7 p.m316.gG2 p.m332.gC5 p.m349.gE7 p.m366.gG3
p.m283.gB4 p.m299.gE6 p.m316.gG3 p.m333.gB5 p.m349.gE8 p.m366.gH3
p.m283.gB5 p.m300.gD7 p.m316.gH2 p.m333.gC5 p.m350.gE1 p.m366.gH4
p.m283.gC4 p.m300.gD8 p.m317.gG3 p.m333.gC6 p.m350.gF1 p.m367.gG4
p.m284.gB5 p.m300.gE7 p.m317.gG4 p.m334.gB6 p.m350.gF2 p.m367.gH4
p.m284.gB6 p.m301.gE1 p.m317.gH3 p.m334.gC6 p.m351.gE2 p.m367.gH5
p.m284.gC5 p.m301.gE2 p.m318.gG4 p.m334.gC7 p.m351.gF2 p.m368.gG5
p.m285.gB6 p.m301.gF1 p.m318.gG5 p.m335.gB7 p.m351.gF3 p.m368.gH5
p.m285.gB7 p.m302.gE2 p.m318.gH4 p.m335.gC7 p.m352.gE3 p.m368.gH6
p.m285.gC6 p.m302.gE3 p.m319.gG5 p.m335.gC8 p.m352.gF3 p.m369.gG6
p.m286.gB7 p.m302.gF2 p.m319.gG6 p.m336.gC1 p.m352.gF4 p.m369.gH6
p.m286.gB8 p.m303.gE3 p.m319.gH5 p.m336.gD1 p.m353.gE4 p.m369.gH7
p.m286.gC7 p.m303.gE4 p.m320.gG6 p.m336.gD2 p.m353.gF4 p.m370.gG7
p.m287.gC1 p.m303.gF3 p.m320.gG7 p.m337.gC2 p.m353.gF5 p.m370.gH7
p.m287.gC2 p.m304.gE4 p.m320.gH6 p.m337.gD2 p.m354.gE5 p.m370.gH8
p.m287.gD1 p.m304.gE5 p.m321.gG7 p.m337.gD3 p.m354.gF5 p.m371.gB1
p.m288.gC2 p.m304.gF4 p.m321.gG8 p.m338.gC3 p.m354.gF6 p.m371.gA2
p.m288.gC3 p.m305.gE5 p.m321.gH7 p.m338.gD3 p.m355.gE6 p.m371.gB2
p.m288.gD2 p.m305.gE6 p.m322.gA1 p.m338.gD4 p.m355.gF6 p.m372.gB2
p.m289.gC3 p.m305.gF5 p.m322.gB1 p.m339.gC4 p.m355.gF7 p.m372.gA3
p.m289.gC4 p.m306.gE6 p.m322.gB2 p.m339.gD4 p.m356.gE7 p.m372.gB3
p.m289.gD3 p.m306.gE7 p.m323.gA2 p.m339.gD5 p.m356.gF7 p.m373.gB3
p.m290.gC4 p.m306.gF6 p.m323.gB2 p.m340.gC5 p.m356.gF8 p.m373.gA4
p.m290.gC5 p.m307.gE7 p.m323.gB3 p.m340.gD5 p.m357.gF1 p.m373.gB4
p.m290.gD4 p.m307.gE8 p.m324.gA3 p.m340.gD6 p.m357.gG1 p.m374.gB4
p.m291.gC5 p.m307.gF7 p.m324.gB3 p.m341.gC6 p.m357.gG2 p.m374.gA5
p.m291.gC6 p.m308.gF1 p.m324.gB4 p.m341.gD6 p.m358.gF2 p.m374.gB5
p.m291.gD5 p.m308.gF2 p.m325.gA4 p.m341.gD7 p.m358.gG2 p.m375.gB5
p.m292.gC6 p.m308.gG1 p.m325.gB4 p.m342.gC7 p.m358.gG3 p.m375.gA6
p.m292.gC7 p.m309.gF2 p.m325.gB5 p.m342.gD7 p.m359.gF3 p.m375.gB6
p.m292.gD6 p.m309.gF3 p.m326.gA5 p.m342.gD8 p.m359.gG3 p.m376.gB6
p.m293.gC7 p.m309.gG2 p.m326.gB5 p.m343.gD1 p.m359.gG4 p.m376.gA7
p.m293.gC8 p.m310.gF3 p.m326.gB6 p.m343.gE1 p.m360.gF4 p.m376.gB7
p.m293.gD7 p.m310.gF4 p.m327.gA6 p.m343.gE2 p.m360.gG4 p.m377.gB7
p.m294.gD1 p.m310.gG3 p.m327.gB6 p.m344.gD2 p.m360.gG5 p.m377.gA8
p.m294.gD2 p.m311.gF4 p.m327.gB7 p.m344.gE2 p.m361.gF5 p.m377.gB8
p.m294.gE1 p.m311.gF5 p.m328.gA7 p.m344.gE3 p.m361.gG5 p.m378.gC1
p.m295.gD2 p.m311.gG4 p.m328.gB7 p.m345.gD3 p.m361.gG6 p.m378.gB2
p.m295.gD3 p.m312.gF5 p.m328.gB8 p.m345.gE3 p.m362.gF6 p.m378.gC2
p.m295.gE2 p.m312.gF6 p.m329.gB1 p.m345.gE4 p.m362.gG6 p.m379.gC2
p.m296.gD3 p.m312.gG5 p.m329.gC1 p.m346.gD4 p.m362.gG7 p.m379.gB3
p.m296.gD4 p.m313.gF6 p.m329.gC2 p.m346.gE4 p.m363.gF7 p.m379.gC3
p.m296.gE3 p.m313.gF7 p.m330.gB2 p.m346.gE5 p.m363.gG7 p.m380.gC3
p.m297.gD4 p.m313.gG6 p.m330.gC2 p.m347.gD5 p.m363.gG8 p.m380.gB4
p.m297.gD5 p.m314.gF7 p.m330.gC3 p.m347.gE5 p.m364.gG1 p.m380.gC4
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p.m381.gC4 p.m397.gE7 p.m414.gG3 p.m431.gB5 p.m447.gE8 p.m464.gG4
p.m381.gB5 p.m398.gE7 p.m414.gH3 p.m431.gB6 p.m448.gE1 p.m464.gH4
p.m381.gC5 p.m398.gD8 p.m415.gH3 p.m431.gC6 p.m448.gE2 p.m465.gG4
p.m382.gC5 p.m398.gE8 p.m415.gG4 p.m432.gB6 p.m448.gF2 p.m465.gG5
p.m382.gB6 p.m399.gF1 p.m415.gH4 p.m432.gB7 p.m449.gE2 p.m465.gH5
p.m382.gC6 p.m399.gE2 p.m416.gH4 p.m432.gC7 p.m449.gE3 p.m466.gG5
p.m383.gC6 p.m399.gF2 p.m416.gG5 p.m433.gB7 p.m449.gF3 p.m466.gG6
p.m383.gB7 p.m400.gF2 p.m416.gH5 p.m433.gB8 p.m450.gE3 p.m466.gH6
p.m383.gC7 p.m400.gE3 p.m417.gH5 p.m433.gC8 p.m450.gE4 p.m467.gG6
p.m384.gC7 p.m400.gF3 p.m417.gG6 p.m434.gC1 p.m450.gF4 p.m467.gG7
p.m384.gB8 p.m401.gF3 p.m417.gH6 p.m434.gC2 p.m451.gE4 p.m467.gH7
p.m384.gC8 p.m401.gE4 p.m418.gH6 p.m434.gD2 p.m451.gE5 p.m468.gG7
p.m385.gD1 p.m401.gF4 p.m418.gG7 p.m435.gC2 p.m451.gF5 p.m468.gG8
p.m385.gC2 p.m402.gF4 p.m418.gH7 p.m435.gC3 p.m452.gE5 p.m468.gH8
p.m385.gD2 p.m402.gE5 p.m419.gH7 p.m435.gD3 p.m452.gE6
p.m386.gD2 p.m402.gF5 p.m419.gG8 p.m436.gC3 p.m452.gF6
p.m386.gC3 p.m403.gF5 p.m419.gH8 p.m436.gC4 p.m453.gE6
p.m386.gD3 p.m403.gE6 p.m420.gA1 p.m436.gD4 p.m453.gE7
p.m387.gD3 p.m403.gF6 p.m420.gA2 p.m437.gC4 p.m453.gF7
p.m387.gC4 p.m404.gF6 p.m420.gB2 p.m437.gC5 p.m454.gE7
p.m387.gD4 p.m404.gE7 p.m421.gA2 p.m437.gD5 p.m454.gE8
p.m388.gD4 p.m404.gF7 p.m421.gA3 p.m438.gC5 p.m454.gF8
p.m388.gC5 p.m405.gF7 p.m421.gB3 p.m438.gC6 p.m455.gF1
p.m388.gD5 p.m405.gE8 p.m422.gA3 p.m438.gD6 p.m455.gF2
p.m389.gD5 p.m405.gF8 p.m422.gA4 p.m439.gC6 p.m455.gG2
p.m389.gC6 p.m406.gG1 p.m422.gB4 p.m439.gC7 p.m456.gF2
p.m389.gD6 p.m406.gF2 p.m423.gA4 p.m439.gD7 p.m456.gF3
p.m390.gD6 p.m406.gG2 p.m423.gA5 p.m440.gC7 p.m456.gG3
p.m390.gC7 p.m407.gG2 p.m423.gB5 p.m440.gC8 p.m457.gF3
p.m390.gD7 p.m407.gF3 p.m424.gA5 p.m440.gD8 p.m457.gF4
p.m391.gD7 p.m407.gG3 p.m424.gA6 p.m441.gD1 p.m457.gG4
p.m391.gC8 p.m408.gG3 p.m424.gB6 p.m441.gD2 p.m458.gF4
p.m391.gD8 p.m408.gF4 p.m425.gA6 p.m441.gE2 p.m458.gF5
p.m392.gE1 p.m408.gG4 p.m425.gA7 p.m442.gD2 p.m458.gG5
p.m392.gD2 p.m409.gG4 p.m425.gB7 p.m442.gD3 p.m459.gF5
p.m392.gE2 p.m409.gF5 p.m426.gA7 p.m442.gE3 p.m459.gF6
p.m393.gE2 p.m409.gG5 p.m426.gA8 p.m443.gD3 p.m459.gG6
p.m393.gD3 p.m410.gG5 p.m426.gB8 p.m443.gD4 p.m460.gF6
p.m393.gE3 p.m410.gF6 p.m427.gB1 p.m443.gE4 p.m460.gF7
p.m394.gE3 p.m410.gG6 p.m427.gB2 p.m444.gD4 p.m460.gG7
p.m394.gD4 p.m411.gG6 p.m427.gC2 p.m444.gD5 p.m461.gF7
p.m394.gE4 p.m411.gF7 p.m428.gB2 p.m444.gE5 p.m461.gF8
p.m395.gE4 p.m411.gG7 p.m428.gB3 p.m445.gD5 p.m461.gG8
p.m395.gD5 p.m412.gG7 p.m428.gC3 p.m445.gD6 p.m462.gG1
p.m395.gE5 p.m412.gF8 p.m429.gB3 p.m445.gE6 p.m462.gG2
p.m396.gE5 p.m412.gG8 p.m429.gB4 p.m446.gD6 p.m462.gH2
p.m396.gD6 p.m413.gH1 p.m429.gC4 p.m446.gD7 p.m463.gG2
p.m396.gE6 p.m413.gG2 p.m430.gB4 p.m446.gE7 p.m463.gG3
p.m397.gE6 p.m413.gH2 p.m430.gB5 p.m447.gD7 p.m463.gH3
p.m397.gD7 p.m414.gH2 p.m430.gC5 p.m447.gD8 p.m464.gG3
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SSN1.m1.gC1 SSN1.m30.gG3 SSN1.m49.gE1 SSN1.m62.gH5 SSN1.m76.gF1 SSN1.m89.gG3
SSN1.m2.gC2 SSN1.m31.gG3 SSN1.m49.gF1 SSN1.m63.gC1 SSN1.m76.gG1 SSN1.m89.gH3
SSN1.m3.gD1 SSN1.m31.gH3 SSN1.m50.gD2 SSN1.m63.gC2 SSN1.m76.gG2 SSN1.m90.gH4
SSN1.m4.gD2 SSN1.m32.gG4 SSN1.m50.gE2 SSN1.m63.gD1 SSN1.m77.gF2 SSN1.m90.gG5
SSN1.m5.gE1 SSN1.m32.gH4 SSN1.m50.gF2 SSN1.m64.gD1 SSN1.m77.gG2 SSN1.m90.gH5
SSN1.m6.gE2 SSN1.m33.gG5 SSN1.m51.gE1 SSN1.m64.gD2 SSN1.m77.gG3 SSN1.m91.gH3
SSN1.m7.gF1 SSN1.m33.gH5 SSN1.m51.gF1 SSN1.m64.gE1 SSN1.m78.gG1 SSN1.m91.gG4
SSN1.m8.gF2 SSN1.m34.gC1 SSN1.m51.gG1 SSN1.m65.gE1 SSN1.m78.gH1 SSN1.m91.gH4
SSN1.m9.gG1 SSN1.m34.gC2 SSN1.m52.gE2 SSN1.m65.gE2 SSN1.m78.gH2 SSN1.m92.gC1
SSN1.m10.gG2 SSN1.m35.gD1 SSN1.m52.gF2 SSN1.m65.gF1 SSN1.m79.gG2 SSN1.m92.gC2
SSN1.m11.gH1 SSN1.m35.gD2 SSN1.m52.gG2 SSN1.m66.gF1 SSN1.m79.gH2 SSN1.m92.gD2
SSN1.m12.gH2 SSN1.m36.gE1 SSN1.m53.gF1 SSN1.m66.gF2 SSN1.m79.gH3 SSN1.m93.gD1
SSN1.m13.gF3 SSN1.m36.gE2 SSN1.m53.gG1 SSN1.m66.gG1 SSN1.m80.gF3 SSN1.m93.gD2
SSN1.m14.gG3 SSN1.m37.gF1 SSN1.m53.gH1 SSN1.m67.gF2 SSN1.m80.gG3 SSN1.m93.gE2
SSN1.m15.gG4 SSN1.m37.gF2 SSN1.m54.gF2 SSN1.m67.gF3 SSN1.m80.gG4 SSN1.m94.gE1
SSN1.m16.gG5 SSN1.m38.gF2 SSN1.m54.gG2 SSN1.m67.gG2 SSN1.m81.gG3 SSN1.m94.gE2
SSN1.m17.gH5 SSN1.m38.gF3 SSN1.m54.gH2 SSN1.m68.gG1 SSN1.m81.gH3 SSN1.m94.gF2
SSN1.m18.gH4 SSN1.m39.gG1 SSN1.m55.gF3 SSN1.m68.gG2 SSN1.m81.gH4 SSN1.m95.gF1
SSN1.m19.gH3 SSN1.m39.gG2 SSN1.m55.gG3 SSN1.m68.gH1 SSN1.m82.gG4 SSN1.m95.gF2
SSN1.m20.gC1 SSN1.m40.gG2 SSN1.m55.gH3 SSN1.m69.gG2 SSN1.m82.gH4 SSN1.m95.gG2
SSN1.m20.gD1 SSN1.m40.gG3 SSN1.m56.gF1 SSN1.m69.gG3 SSN1.m82.gH5 SSN1.m96.gF2
SSN1.m21.gC2 SSN1.m41.gH1 SSN1.m56.gF2 SSN1.m69.gH2 SSN1.m83.gD1 SSN1.m96.gF3
SSN1.m21.gD2 SSN1.m41.gH2 SSN1.m56.gF3 SSN1.m70.gG3 SSN1.m83.gC2 SSN1.m96.gG3
SSN1.m22.gD1 SSN1.m42.gH2 SSN1.m57.gG1 SSN1.m70.gG4 SSN1.m83.gD2 SSN1.m97.gG1
SSN1.m22.gE1 SSN1.m42.gH3 SSN1.m57.gG2 SSN1.m70.gH3 SSN1.m84.gE1 SSN1.m97.gG2
SSN1.m23.gD2 SSN1.m43.gG3 SSN1.m57.gG3 SSN1.m71.gG4 SSN1.m84.gD2 SSN1.m97.gH2
SSN1.m23.gE2 SSN1.m43.gG4 SSN1.m58.gG2 SSN1.m71.gG5 SSN1.m84.gE2 SSN1.m98.gG2
SSN1.m24.gE1 SSN1.m44.gG4 SSN1.m58.gG3 SSN1.m71.gH4 SSN1.m85.gF1 SSN1.m98.gG3
SSN1.m24.gF1 SSN1.m44.gG5 SSN1.m58.gG4 SSN1.m72.gC1 SSN1.m85.gE2 SSN1.m98.gH3
SSN1.m25.gE2 SSN1.m45.gH4 SSN1.m59.gH1 SSN1.m72.gD1 SSN1.m85.gF2 SSN1.m99.gG3
SSN1.m25.gF2 SSN1.m45.gH5 SSN1.m59.gH2 SSN1.m72.gD2 SSN1.m86.gG1 SSN1.m99.gG4
SSN1.m26.gF1 SSN1.m46.gH3 SSN1.m59.gH3 SSN1.m73.gD1 SSN1.m86.gF2 SSN1.m99.gH4
SSN1.m26.gG1 SSN1.m46.gH4 SSN1.m60.gH2 SSN1.m73.gE1 SSN1.m86.gG2 SSN1.m100.gG4
SSN1.m27.gF2 SSN1.m47.gC1 SSN1.m60.gH3 SSN1.m73.gE2 SSN1.m87.gG2 SSN1.m100.gG5
SSN1.m27.gG2 SSN1.m47.gD1 SSN1.m60.gH4 SSN1.m74.gE1 SSN1.m87.gF3 SSN1.m100.gH5
SSN1.m28.gG1 SSN1.m47.gE1 SSN1.m61.gG3 SSN1.m74.gF1 SSN1.m87.gG3
SSN1.m28.gH1 SSN1.m48.gC2 SSN1.m61.gG4 SSN1.m74.gF2 SSN1.m88.gH1
SSN1.m29.gG2 SSN1.m48.gD2 SSN1.m61.gG5 SSN1.m75.gE2 SSN1.m88.gG2
SSN1.m29.gH2 SSN1.m48.gE2 SSN1.m62.gH3 SSN1.m75.gF2 SSN1.m88.gH2
SSN1.m30.gF3 SSN1.m49.gD1 SSN1.m62.gH4 SSN1.m75.gF3 SSN1.m89.gH2
G pm  (for SSN1)
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SSN2.m1.gA4 SSN2.m38.gC4 SSN2.m60.gA5 SSN2.m81.gF7 SSN2.m97.gC6 SSN2.m111.gC5
SSN2.m2.gA5 SSN2.m39.gB5 SSN2.m60.gA6 SSN2.m82.gF7 SSN2.m97.gD6 SSN2.m111.gC6
SSN2.m3.gA6 SSN2.m39.gC5 SSN2.m61.gA6 SSN2.m82.gF8 SSN2.m97.gE6 SSN2.m112.gC5
SSN2.m4.gA7 SSN2.m40.gB6 SSN2.m61.gA7 SSN2.m83.gD3 SSN2.m98.gC7 SSN2.m112.gC6
SSN2.m5.gA8 SSN2.m40.gC6 SSN2.m62.gA7 SSN2.m83.gD4 SSN2.m98.gD7 SSN2.m112.gC7
SSN2.m6.gB4 SSN2.m41.gB7 SSN2.m62.gA8 SSN2.m84.gE3 SSN2.m98.gE7 SSN2.m113.gC6
SSN2.m7.gB5 SSN2.m41.gC7 SSN2.m63.gB4 SSN2.m84.gE4 SSN2.m99.gC8 SSN2.m113.gC7
SSN2.m8.gB6 SSN2.m42.gB8 SSN2.m63.gB5 SSN2.m85.gA4 SSN2.m99.gD8 SSN2.m113.gC8
SSN2.m9.gB7 SSN2.m42.gC8 SSN2.m64.gB5 SSN2.m85.gB4 SSN2.m99.gE8 SSN2.m114.gD4
SSN2.m10.gB8 SSN2.m43.gC4 SSN2.m64.gB6 SSN2.m85.gC4 SSN2.m100.gD4 SSN2.m114.gD5
SSN2.m11.gC4 SSN2.m43.gD4 SSN2.m65.gB6 SSN2.m86.gA5 SSN2.m100.gE4 SSN2.m114.gD6
SSN2.m12.gC5 SSN2.m44.gC5 SSN2.m65.gB7 SSN2.m86.gB5 SSN2.m100.gF4 SSN2.m115.gD5
SSN2.m13.gC6 SSN2.m44.gD5 SSN2.m66.gB7 SSN2.m86.gC5 SSN2.m101.gD5 SSN2.m115.gD6
SSN2.m14.gC7 SSN2.m45.gC6 SSN2.m66.gB8 SSN2.m87.gA6 SSN2.m101.gE5 SSN2.m115.gD7
SSN2.m15.gC8 SSN2.m45.gD6 SSN2.m67.gC4 SSN2.m87.gB6 SSN2.m101.gF5 SSN2.m116.gD6
SSN2.m16.gD4 SSN2.m46.gC7 SSN2.m67.gC5 SSN2.m87.gC6 SSN2.m102.gD6 SSN2.m116.gD7
SSN2.m17.gD5 SSN2.m46.gD7 SSN2.m68.gC5 SSN2.m88.gA7 SSN2.m102.gE6 SSN2.m116.gD8
SSN2.m18.gD6 SSN2.m47.gC8 SSN2.m68.gC6 SSN2.m88.gB7 SSN2.m102.gF6 SSN2.m117.gE4
SSN2.m19.gD7 SSN2.m47.gD8 SSN2.m69.gC6 SSN2.m88.gC7 SSN2.m103.gD7 SSN2.m117.gE5
SSN2.m20.gD8 SSN2.m48.gD4 SSN2.m69.gC7 SSN2.m89.gA8 SSN2.m103.gE7 SSN2.m117.gE6
SSN2.m21.gE4 SSN2.m48.gE4 SSN2.m70.gC7 SSN2.m89.gB8 SSN2.m103.gF7 SSN2.m118.gE5
SSN2.m22.gE5 SSN2.m49.gD5 SSN2.m70.gC8 SSN2.m89.gC8 SSN2.m104.gD8 SSN2.m118.gE6
SSN2.m23.gE6 SSN2.m49.gE5 SSN2.m71.gD4 SSN2.m90.gB4 SSN2.m104.gE8 SSN2.m118.gE7
SSN2.m24.gE7 SSN2.m50.gD6 SSN2.m71.gD5 SSN2.m90.gC4 SSN2.m104.gF8 SSN2.m119.gE6
SSN2.m25.gE8 SSN2.m50.gE6 SSN2.m72.gD5 SSN2.m90.gD4 SSN2.m105.gA4 SSN2.m119.gE7
SSN2.m26.gF4 SSN2.m51.gD7 SSN2.m72.gD6 SSN2.m91.gB5 SSN2.m105.gA5 SSN2.m119.gE8
SSN2.m27.gF5 SSN2.m51.gE7 SSN2.m73.gD6 SSN2.m91.gC5 SSN2.m105.gA6 SSN2.m120.gF4
SSN2.m28.gF6 SSN2.m52.gD8 SSN2.m73.gD7 SSN2.m91.gD5 SSN2.m106.gA5 SSN2.m120.gF5
SSN2.m29.gF7 SSN2.m52.gE8 SSN2.m74.gD7 SSN2.m92.gB6 SSN2.m106.gA6 SSN2.m120.gF6
SSN2.m30.gF8 SSN2.m53.gE4 SSN2.m74.gD8 SSN2.m92.gC6 SSN2.m106.gA7 SSN2.m121.gF5
SSN2.m31.gD3 SSN2.m53.gF4 SSN2.m75.gE4 SSN2.m92.gD6 SSN2.m107.gA6 SSN2.m121.gF6
SSN2.m32.gE3 SSN2.m54.gE5 SSN2.m75.gE5 SSN2.m93.gB7 SSN2.m107.gA7 SSN2.m121.gF7
SSN2.m33.gA4 SSN2.m54.gF5 SSN2.m76.gE5 SSN2.m93.gC7 SSN2.m107.gA8 SSN2.m122.gF6
SSN2.m33.gB4 SSN2.m55.gE6 SSN2.m76.gE6 SSN2.m93.gD7 SSN2.m108.gB4 SSN2.m122.gF7
SSN2.m34.gA5 SSN2.m55.gF6 SSN2.m77.gE6 SSN2.m94.gB8 SSN2.m108.gB5 SSN2.m122.gF8
SSN2.m34.gB5 SSN2.m56.gE7 SSN2.m77.gE7 SSN2.m94.gC8 SSN2.m108.gB6 SSN2.m123.gD3
SSN2.m35.gA6 SSN2.m56.gF7 SSN2.m78.gE7 SSN2.m94.gD8 SSN2.m109.gB5 SSN2.m123.gD4
SSN2.m35.gB6 SSN2.m57.gE8 SSN2.m78.gE8 SSN2.m95.gC4 SSN2.m109.gB6 SSN2.m123.gD5
SSN2.m36.gA7 SSN2.m57.gF8 SSN2.m79.gF4 SSN2.m95.gD4 SSN2.m109.gB7 SSN2.m124.gE3
SSN2.m36.gB7 SSN2.m58.gD3 SSN2.m79.gF5 SSN2.m95.gE4 SSN2.m110.gB6 SSN2.m124.gE4
SSN2.m37.gA8 SSN2.m58.gE3 SSN2.m80.gF5 SSN2.m96.gC5 SSN2.m110.gB7 SSN2.m124.gE5
SSN2.m37.gB8 SSN2.m59.gA4 SSN2.m80.gF6 SSN2.m96.gD5 SSN2.m110.gB8 SSN2.m125.gA4
SSN2.m38.gB4 SSN2.m59.gA5 SSN2.m81.gF6 SSN2.m96.gE5 SSN2.m111.gC4 SSN2.m125.gA5
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SSN2.m125.gB4 SSN2.m140.gD7 SSN2.m154.gD4 SSN2.m168.gB6 SSN2.m183.gF4 SSN2.m197.gC5
SSN2.m126.gA5 SSN2.m140.gD8 SSN2.m154.gD5 SSN2.m169.gB6 SSN2.m183.gE5 SSN2.m197.gD5
SSN2.m126.gA6 SSN2.m140.gE7 SSN2.m155.gC5 SSN2.m169.gA7 SSN2.m183.gF5 SSN2.m198.gC5
SSN2.m126.gB5 SSN2.m141.gE4 SSN2.m155.gD5 SSN2.m169.gB7 SSN2.m184.gF5 SSN2.m198.gC6
SSN2.m127.gA6 SSN2.m141.gE5 SSN2.m155.gD6 SSN2.m170.gB7 SSN2.m184.gE6 SSN2.m198.gD6
SSN2.m127.gA7 SSN2.m141.gF4 SSN2.m156.gC6 SSN2.m170.gA8 SSN2.m184.gF6 SSN2.m199.gC6
SSN2.m127.gB6 SSN2.m142.gE5 SSN2.m156.gD6 SSN2.m170.gB8 SSN2.m185.gF6 SSN2.m199.gC7
SSN2.m128.gA7 SSN2.m142.gE6 SSN2.m156.gD7 SSN2.m171.gC4 SSN2.m185.gE7 SSN2.m199.gD7
SSN2.m128.gA8 SSN2.m142.gF5 SSN2.m157.gC7 SSN2.m171.gB5 SSN2.m185.gF7 SSN2.m200.gC7
SSN2.m128.gB7 SSN2.m143.gE6 SSN2.m157.gD7 SSN2.m171.gC5 SSN2.m186.gF7 SSN2.m200.gC8
SSN2.m129.gB4 SSN2.m143.gE7 SSN2.m157.gD8 SSN2.m172.gC5 SSN2.m186.gE8 SSN2.m200.gD8
SSN2.m129.gB5 SSN2.m143.gF6 SSN2.m158.gD4 SSN2.m172.gB6 SSN2.m186.gF8 SSN2.m201.gD4
SSN2.m129.gC4 SSN2.m144.gE7 SSN2.m158.gE4 SSN2.m172.gC6 SSN2.m187.gD3 SSN2.m201.gD5
SSN2.m130.gB5 SSN2.m144.gE8 SSN2.m158.gE5 SSN2.m173.gC6 SSN2.m187.gC4 SSN2.m201.gE5
SSN2.m130.gB6 SSN2.m144.gF7 SSN2.m159.gD5 SSN2.m173.gB7 SSN2.m187.gD4 SSN2.m202.gD5
SSN2.m130.gC5 SSN2.m145.gD3 SSN2.m159.gE5 SSN2.m173.gC7 SSN2.m188.gE3 SSN2.m202.gD6
SSN2.m131.gB6 SSN2.m145.gD4 SSN2.m159.gE6 SSN2.m174.gC7 SSN2.m188.gD4 SSN2.m202.gE6
SSN2.m131.gB7 SSN2.m145.gE3 SSN2.m160.gD6 SSN2.m174.gB8 SSN2.m188.gE4 SSN2.m203.gD6
SSN2.m131.gC6 SSN2.m146.gA4 SSN2.m160.gE6 SSN2.m174.gC8 SSN2.m189.gA4 SSN2.m203.gD7
SSN2.m132.gB7 SSN2.m146.gB4 SSN2.m160.gE7 SSN2.m175.gD4 SSN2.m189.gA5 SSN2.m203.gE7
SSN2.m132.gB8 SSN2.m146.gB5 SSN2.m161.gD7 SSN2.m175.gC5 SSN2.m189.gB5 SSN2.m204.gD7
SSN2.m132.gC7 SSN2.m147.gA5 SSN2.m161.gE7 SSN2.m175.gD5 SSN2.m190.gA5 SSN2.m204.gD8
SSN2.m133.gC4 SSN2.m147.gB5 SSN2.m161.gE8 SSN2.m176.gD5 SSN2.m190.gA6 SSN2.m204.gE8
SSN2.m133.gC5 SSN2.m147.gB6 SSN2.m162.gE4 SSN2.m176.gC6 SSN2.m190.gB6 SSN2.m205.gE4
SSN2.m133.gD4 SSN2.m148.gA6 SSN2.m162.gF4 SSN2.m176.gD6 SSN2.m191.gA6 SSN2.m205.gE5
SSN2.m134.gC5 SSN2.m148.gB6 SSN2.m162.gF5 SSN2.m177.gD6 SSN2.m191.gA7 SSN2.m205.gF5
SSN2.m134.gC6 SSN2.m148.gB7 SSN2.m163.gE5 SSN2.m177.gC7 SSN2.m191.gB7 SSN2.m206.gE5
SSN2.m134.gD5 SSN2.m149.gA7 SSN2.m163.gF5 SSN2.m177.gD7 SSN2.m192.gA7 SSN2.m206.gE6
SSN2.m135.gC6 SSN2.m149.gB7 SSN2.m163.gF6 SSN2.m178.gD7 SSN2.m192.gA8 SSN2.m206.gF6
SSN2.m135.gC7 SSN2.m149.gB8 SSN2.m164.gE6 SSN2.m178.gC8 SSN2.m192.gB8 SSN2.m207.gE6
SSN2.m135.gD6 SSN2.m150.gB4 SSN2.m164.gF6 SSN2.m178.gD8 SSN2.m193.gB4 SSN2.m207.gE7
SSN2.m136.gC7 SSN2.m150.gC4 SSN2.m164.gF7 SSN2.m179.gE4 SSN2.m193.gB5 SSN2.m207.gF7
SSN2.m136.gC8 SSN2.m150.gC5 SSN2.m165.gE7 SSN2.m179.gD5 SSN2.m193.gC5 SSN2.m208.gE7
SSN2.m136.gD7 SSN2.m151.gB5 SSN2.m165.gF7 SSN2.m179.gE5 SSN2.m194.gB5 SSN2.m208.gE8
SSN2.m137.gD4 SSN2.m151.gC5 SSN2.m165.gF8 SSN2.m180.gE5 SSN2.m194.gB6 SSN2.m208.gF8
SSN2.m137.gD5 SSN2.m151.gC6 SSN2.m166.gD3 SSN2.m180.gD6 SSN2.m194.gC6 SSN2.m209.gD3
SSN2.m137.gE4 SSN2.m152.gB6 SSN2.m166.gE3 SSN2.m180.gE6 SSN2.m195.gB6 SSN2.m209.gD4
SSN2.m138.gD5 SSN2.m152.gC6 SSN2.m166.gE4 SSN2.m181.gE6 SSN2.m195.gB7 SSN2.m209.gE4
SSN2.m138.gD6 SSN2.m152.gC7 SSN2.m167.gB4 SSN2.m181.gD7 SSN2.m195.gC7 SSN2.m210.gE3
SSN2.m138.gE5 SSN2.m153.gB7 SSN2.m167.gA5 SSN2.m181.gE7 SSN2.m196.gB7 SSN2.m210.gE4
SSN2.m139.gD6 SSN2.m153.gC7 SSN2.m167.gB5 SSN2.m182.gE7 SSN2.m196.gB8 SSN2.m210.gF4
SSN2.m139.gD7 SSN2.m153.gC8 SSN2.m168.gB5 SSN2.m182.gD8 SSN2.m196.gC8
SSN2.m139.gE6 SSN2.m154.gC4 SSN2.m168.gA6 SSN2.m182.gE8 SSN2.m197.gC4




dist g teth_range p'' r psg
gA1  25.0 Helo1 10.0 Surf1.active Surf2.active Surf3.active Helo1.active Helo2.active P31.active SSN1.passive SSN1.active SSN2.passive
gA2  20.0 Helo2 10.0 gA1 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.49 0.49 0.53 0.44 0.61 0.44
gA3  15.0 gA2 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.55 0.55 0.6 0.5 0.69 0.5
gA4  10.0 trans p gA3 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.47 0.47 0.51 0.42 0.59 0.42
gA5  10.0 Surf1  0.5 gA4 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.64 0.64 0.69 0.57 0.8 0.57
gA6  10.0 Surf2  0.5 gA5 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.87 0.87 0.95 0.78 1.09 0.78
gA7  10.0 Surf3  0.5 gA6 0.95 0.95 0.95 1.14 1.14 1.24 1.02 1.43 1.02
gA8  10.0 Helo1  0.1 gA7 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.99 0.99 1.07 0.89 1.24 0.89
gB1  20.0 Helo2  0.1 gA8 0.92 0.92 0.92 1.11 1.11 1.2 0.99 1.39 0.99
gB2  20.0 P31  0.1 gB1 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.52 0.52 0.56 0.47 0.65 0.47
gB3  15.0 SSN1  0.7 gB2 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.5 0.5 0.55 0.45 0.63 0.45
gB4  10.0 SSN2  0.7 gB3 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.64 0.64 0.69 0.57 0.8 0.57
gB5  5.0 gB4 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.6 0.84 0.6
gB6  5.0 gB5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.84 0.84 0.91 0.75 1.05 0.75
gB7  5.0 gB6 0.91 0.91 0.91 1.09 1.09 1.18 0.97 1.36 0.97
gB8  10.0 gB7 0.95 0.95 0.95 1.14 1.14 1.24 1.02 1.43 1.02
gC1  15.0 gB8 0.97 0.97 0.97 1.16 1.16 1.26 1.04 1.45 1.04
gC2  15.0 gC1 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.57 0.57 0.62 0.51 0.71 0.51
gC3  15.0 gC2 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.6 0.84 0.6
gC4  10.0 gC3 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.59 0.59 0.64 0.53 0.74 0.53
gC5  5.0 gC4 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.6 0.84 0.6
gC6  0.0 gC5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.84 0.84 0.91 0.75 1.05 0.75
gC7  5.0 gC6 0.88 0.88 0.88 1.05 1.05 1.14 0.94 1.32 0.94
gC8  10.0 gC7 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.24 1.24 1.34 1.11 1.55 1.11
gD1  10.0 gC8 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.19 1.19 1.29 1.07 1.49 1.07
gD2  10.0 gD1 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.71 0.71 0.76 0.63 0.88 0.63
gD3  10.0 gD2 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.6 0.84 0.6
gD4  10.0 gD3 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.76 0.76 0.82 0.68 0.95 0.68
gD5  5.0 gD4 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.84 0.84 0.91 0.75 1.05 0.75
gD6  5.0 gD5 0.84 0.84 0.84 1.01 1.01 1.09 0.9 1.26 0.9
gD7  5.0 gD6 0.91 0.91 0.91 1.1 1.1 1.19 0.98 1.37 0.98
gD8  10.0 gD7 0.97 0.97 0.96 1.16 1.16 1.26 1.03 1.45 1.03
gE1  10.0 gD8 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.18 1.18 1.27 1.05 1.47 1.05
gE2  5.0 gE1 0.95 0.95 0.95 1.14 1.14 1.24 1.02 1.43 1.02
gE3  5.0 gE2 0.91 0.91 0.91 1.09 1.09 1.18 0.98 1.37 0.98
gE4  5.0 gE3 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.22 1.22 1.32 1.08 1.52 1.08
gE5  10.0 gE4 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.92 0.92 1 0.83 1.16 0.83
gE6  10.0 gE5 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.76 0.76 0.82 0.68 0.95 0.68
gE7  10.0 gE6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.84 0.84 0.91 0.75 1.05 0.75
gE8  10.0 gE7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.84 0.84 0.91 0.75 1.05 0.75
gF1  10.0 gE8 0.85 0.85 0.85 1.02 1.02 1.11 0.92 1.28 0.92
gF2  5.0 gF1 0.87 0.87 0.87 1.04 1.04 1.13 0.93 1.3 0.93
gF3  0.0 gF2 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.19 1.19 1.29 1.06 1.48 1.06
gF4  5.0 gF3 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.24 1.24 1.34 1.1 1.55 1.1
gF5  10.0 gF4 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.76 0.76 0.82 0.68 0.95 0.68
gF6  15.0 gF5 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.59 0.59 0.64 0.53 0.74 0.53
gF7  15.0 gF6 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.6 0.84 0.6
gF8  15.0 gF7 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.6 0.84 0.6
gG1  10.0 gF8 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.79 0.79 0.86 0.71 0.99 0.71
gG2  5.0 gG1 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.19 1.19 1.29 1.07 1.49 1.07
gG3  5.0 gG2 0.95 0.95 0.95 1.14 1.14 1.24 1.02 1.43 1.02
gG4  5.0 gG3 0.88 0.88 0.88 1.05 1.05 1.14 0.94 1.31 0.94
gG5  10.0 gG4 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.6 0.84 0.6
gG6  15.0 gG5 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.5 0.5 0.55 0.45 0.63 0.45
gG7  20.0 gG6 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.5 0.5 0.55 0.45 0.63 0.45
gG8  20.0 gG7 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.5 0.5 0.55 0.45 0.63 0.45
gH1  10.0 gG8 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.55 0.55 0.6 0.5 0.69 0.5
gH2  10.0 gH1 0.97 0.97 0.97 1.16 1.16 1.26 1.04 1.45 1.04
gH3  10.0 gH2 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.18 1.18 1.27 1.05 1.47 1.05
gH4  10.0 gH3 0.84 0.84 0.84 1.01 1.01 1.09 0.9 1.26 0.9
gH5  10.0 gH4 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.81 0.81 0.87 0.72 1.01 0.72
gH6  15.0 gH5 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.49 0.49 0.53 0.44 0.61 0.44
gH7  20.0 gH6 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.69 0.69 0.75 0.62 0.86 0.62
gH8  25.0 gH7 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.59 0.59 0.64 0.53 0.74 0.53
gH8 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.64 0.64 0.69 0.57 0.8 0.57  
 78
range m'm''
Determined from table below
e.g., for range(m1, m83), take the minimum of the distances (gA1, gC3), (gA1, gD3), which are 14.1, 18.  Therefore, range(m1, m83) is 14.1.
 gA1  gA2  gA3  gA4  gA5  gA6  gA7  gA8  gB1  gB2  gB3  gB4  gB5  gB6  gB7  gB8  gC1  gC2  gC3  gC4  gC5  gC6  gC7  gC8  gD1  gD2  gD3  gD4  gD5  gD6  gD7  gD8
gA1 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 35.4 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 36.4 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5 38.1
gA2 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5
gA3 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2
gA4 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25
gA5 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2
gA6 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18
gA7 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8
gA8 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 35.4 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 36.4 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 38.1 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15
gB1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 35.4 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 35.4 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 36.4
gB2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6
gB3 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9
gB4 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4
gB5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18
gB6 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1
gB7 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2
gB8 35.4 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 35.4 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 36.4 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10
gC1 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 36.4 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 35.4 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 35.4
gC2 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4
gC3 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5
gC4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6
gC5 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8
gC6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2
gC7 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1
gC8 36.4 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 35.4 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 35.4 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5
gD1 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5 38.1 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 36.4 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 35.4 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
gD2 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
gD3 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 25
gD4 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20
gD5 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 15
gD6 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 10
gD7 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 5
gD8 38.1 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 36.4 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 35.4 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
gE1 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 36.1 40.3 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5 38.1 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 36.4 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 35.4
gE2 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 36.1 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4
gE3 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5
gE4 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6
gE5 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8
gE6 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2
gE7 36.1 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1
gE8 40.3 36.1 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 38.1 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 36.4 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 35.4 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5
gF1 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4 39.1 43 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 36.1 40.3 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5 38.1 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 36.4
gF2 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4 39.1 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 36.1 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6
gF3 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9
gF4 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4
gF5 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18
gF6 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1
gF7 39.1 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 36.1 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2
gF8 43 39.1 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 40.3 36.1 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 38.1 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 36.4 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10
gG1 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 36.1 39.1 42.4 46.1 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4 39.1 43 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 36.1 40.3 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5 38.1
gG2 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 36.1 39.1 42.4 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4 39.1 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 36.1 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5
gG3 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 36.1 39.1 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2
gG4 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 36.1 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25
gG5 36.1 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2
gG6 39.1 36.1 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18
gG7 42.4 39.1 36.1 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 39.1 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 36.1 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8
gG8 46.1 42.4 39.1 36.1 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 43 39.1 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 40.3 36.1 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 38.1 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15
gH1 35 35.4 36.4 38.1 40.3 43 46.1 49.5 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 36.1 39.1 42.4 46.1 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4 39.1 43 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 36.1 40.3
gH2 35.4 35 35.4 36.4 38.1 40.3 43 46.1 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 36.1 39.1 42.4 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4 39.1 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 36.1
gH3 36.4 35.4 35 35.4 36.4 38.1 40.3 43 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 36.1 39.1 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32
gH4 38.1 36.4 35.4 35 35.4 36.4 38.1 40.3 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 36.1 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3
gH5 40.3 38.1 36.4 35.4 35 35.4 36.4 38.1 36.1 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25
gH6 43 40.3 38.1 36.4 35.4 35 35.4 36.4 39.1 36.1 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4
gH7 46.1 43 40.3 38.1 36.4 35.4 35 35.4 42.4 39.1 36.1 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 39.1 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 36.1 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6
gH8 49.5 46.1 43 40.3 38.1 36.4 35.4 35 46.1 42.4 39.1 36.1 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 43 39.1 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 40.3 36.1 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20  
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range m'm'' (continued)
 gE1  gE2  gE3  gE4  gE5  gE6  gE7  gE8  gF1  gF2  gF3  gF4  gF5  gF6  gF7  gF8  gG1  gG2  gG3  gG4  gG5  gG6  gG7  gG8  gH1  gH2  gH3  gH4  gH5  gH6  gH7  gH8
gA1 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 36.1 40.3 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4 39.1 43 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 36.1 39.1 42.4 46.1 35 35.4 36.4 38.1 40.3 43 46.1 49.5
gA2 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 36.1 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4 39.1 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 36.1 39.1 42.4 35.4 35 35.4 36.4 38.1 40.3 43 46.1
gA3 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 36.1 39.1 36.4 35.4 35 35.4 36.4 38.1 40.3 43
gA4 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 36.1 38.1 36.4 35.4 35 35.4 36.4 38.1 40.3
gA5 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 36.1 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 40.3 38.1 36.4 35.4 35 35.4 36.4 38.1
gA6 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 39.1 36.1 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 43 40.3 38.1 36.4 35.4 35 35.4 36.4
gA7 36.1 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 39.1 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 42.4 39.1 36.1 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 46.1 43 40.3 38.1 36.4 35.4 35 35.4
gA8 40.3 36.1 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 43 39.1 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 46.1 42.4 39.1 36.1 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 49.5 46.1 43 40.3 38.1 36.4 35.4 35
gB1 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5 38.1 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 36.1 40.3 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4 39.1 43 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 36.1 39.1 42.4 46.1
gB2 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 36.1 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4 39.1 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 36.1 39.1 42.4
gB3 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 36.1 39.1
gB4 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 33.5 36.1
gB5 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 36.1 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 31.6 33.5
gB6 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 39.1 36.1 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 30.4 31.6
gB7 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 36.1 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 39.1 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 42.4 39.1 36.1 33.5 31.6 30.4 30 30.4
gB8 38.1 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 40.3 36.1 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 43 39.1 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 46.1 42.4 39.1 36.1 33.5 31.6 30.4 30
gC1 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 36.4 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5 38.1 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 36.1 40.3 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4 39.1 43
gC2 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 36.1 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4 39.1
gC3 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32 35.4
gC4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2 32
gC5 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9 29.2
gC6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5 26.9
gC7 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 36.1 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 39.1 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25 25.5
gC8 36.4 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 38.1 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 40.3 36.1 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 43 39.1 35.4 32 29.2 26.9 25.5 25
gD1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 35.4 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 36.4 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5 38.1 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 36.1 40.3
gD2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32 36.1
gD3 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3 32
gD4 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25 28.3
gD5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4 25
gD6 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6 22.4
gD7 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 36.1 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20 20.6
gD8 35.4 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 36.4 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 38.1 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 40.3 36.1 32 28.3 25 22.4 20.6 20
gE1 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 35.4 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 36.4 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5 38.1
gE2 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5
gE3 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2
gE4 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25
gE5 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2
gE6 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18
gE7 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8
gE8 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 35.4 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 36.4 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 38.1 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15
gF1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 35.4 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 35.4 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 36.4
gF2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6
gF3 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9
gF4 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4
gF5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18
gF6 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1
gF7 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2
gF8 35.4 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 35.4 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 36.4 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10
gG1 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 36.4 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 35.4 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 35.4
gG2 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4
gG3 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5
gG4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6
gG5 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8
gG6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2
gG7 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1
gG8 36.4 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 35.4 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 35.4 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5
gH1 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5 38.1 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 36.4 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 35.4 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
gH2 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 33.5 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 31.6 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 30.4 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
gH3 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 29.2 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 26.9 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 25.5 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 25
gH4 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 25 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 22.4 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20.6 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20
gH5 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 21.2 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 18 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 15.8 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 15
gH6 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 18 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 14.1 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 11.2 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 10
gH7 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 15.8 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 11.2 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 7.1 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 5
gH8 38.1 33.5 29.2 25 21.2 18 15.8 15 36.4 31.6 26.9 22.4 18 14.1 11.2 10 35.4 30.4 25.5 20.6 15.8 11.2 7.1 5 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0  
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E. EXAMPLE FIVE:  CHOKE-POINT SCENARIO 
Sets
P VIS P SECRET P FLEX P BASE P TETH PP TETH G M M ps








g+.gA1 gB4.gB5 gC5.gB6 gD5.gE4 gF1.gE1 gB2
g+.gB1 gB4.gC3 gC5.gC4 gD5.gE5 gF1.gE2 gB3
g+.gC1 gB4.gC4 gC5.gC6 gD5.gE6 gF1.gF2 gB4
g+.gD1 gB4.gC5 gC5.gD4 gD6.gC5 gF2.gE1 gB5
g+.gE1 gB5.gA5 gC5.gD5 gD6.gC6 gF2.gE2 gB6
g+.gF1 gB5.gA6 gC5.gD6 gD6.gD5 gF2.gE3 gC1
gA1.gA2 gB5.gB4 gC5.g- gD6.gE5 gF2.gF1 gC2
gA1.gB1 gB5.gB6 gC6.gB5 gD6.gE6 gF3.gE2 gC3
gA1.gB2 gB5.gC4 gC6.gB6 gD6.g- gF3.gE3 gC4
gA2.gA1 gB5.gC5 gC6.gC5 gE1.gD1 gF3.gE4 gC5
gA2.gB1 gB5.gC6 gC6.gD5 gE1.gD2 gF3.gF2 gC6
gA2.gB2 gB6.gA5 gC6.gD6 gE1.gE2 gF4.gE3 gD1
gA2.gB3 gB6.gA6 gC6.g- gE1.gF1 gF4.gE4 gD2
gA3.gA2 gB6.gB5 gD1.gC1 gE1.gF2 gF4.gE5 gD3
gA3.gB2 gB6.gC5 gD1.gC2 gE2.gD1 gF4.gF5 gD4
gA3.gB3 gB6.gC6 gD1.gD2 gE2.gD2 gF5.gE4 gD5 (protected)
gA3.gB4 gC1.gB1 gD1.gE1 gE2.gD3 gF5.gE5 gD6
gA4.gA5 gC1.gB2 gD1.gE2 gE2.gE1 gF5.gE6 gE1
gA4.gB3 gC1.gC2 gD2.gC1 gE2.gE3 gF5.gF6 gE2
gA4.gB4 gC1.gD1 gD2.gC2 gE2.gF1 gF6.gE5 gE3
gA4.gB5 gC1.gD2 gD2.gC3 gE2.gF2 gF6.gE6 gE4
gA5.gA6 gC2.gB1 gD2.gD1 gE3.gD2 gF6.gF5 gE5
gA5.gB4 gC2.gB2 gD2.gD3 gE3.gD3 gE6
gA5.gB5 gC2.gB3 gD2.gE1 gE3.gD4 gF1
gA5.gB6 gC2.gC1 gD2.gE2 gE3.gE2 gF2
gA6.gA5 gC2.gC3 gD2.gE3 gE3.gE4 gF3 (impassable)
gA6.gB5 gC2.gD1 gD3.gC2 gE3.gF2 gF4 (impassable)
gA6.gB6 gC2.gD2 gD3.gC3 gE4.gD3 gF5
gB1.gA1 gC2.gD3 gD3.gC4 gE4.gD4 gF6 
gB1.gA2 gC3.gB2 gD3.gD2 gE4.gD5 g-
gB1.gB2 gC3.gB3 gD3.gD4 gE4.gE3
gB1.gC1 gC3.gB4 gD3.gE2 gE4.gE5
gB1.gC2 gC3.gC2 gD3.gE3 gE4.gF5
gB2.gA1 gC3.gC4 gD3.gE4 gE4.g-
gB2.gA2 gC3.gD2 gD4.gC3 gE5.gD4
gB2.gB1 gC3.gD3 gD4.gC4 gE5.gD5
gB2.gB3 gC3.gD4 gD4.gC5 gE5.gD6
gB2.gC1 gC4.gB3 gD4.gD3 gE5.gE4
gB2.gC2 gC4.gB4 gD4.gD5 gE5.gE6
gB2.gC3 gC4.gB5 gD4.gE3 gE5.gF5
gB3.gA2 gC4.gC3 gD4.gE4 gE5.gF6
gB3.gB2 gC4.gC5 gD4.gE5 gE5.g-
gB3.gB4 gC4.gD3 gD4.g- gE6.gD5
gB3.gC2 gC4.gD4 gD5.gC4 gE6.gD6
gB3.gC3 gC4.gD5 gD5.gC5 gE6.gE5
gB3.gC4 gC4.g- gD5.gC6 gE6.gF5
gB4.gA5 gC5.gB4 gD5.gD4 gE6.gF6
gB4.gB3 gC5.gB5 gD5.gD6 gE6.g-  
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p.m1.gA1 p.m37.gB1 p.m57.gE5 p.m77.gE2 p.m92.gC6 p.m105.gB5
p.m2.gA2 p.m37.gC1 p.m57.gF5 p.m77.gE3 p.m92.gD6 p.m106.gB4
p.m3.gA5 p.m38.gB2 p.m58.gE6 p.m78.gE3 p.m93.gC1 p.m106.gB5
p.m4.gA6 p.m38.gC2 p.m58.gF6 p.m78.gE4 p.m93.gD1 p.m106.gB6
p.m5.gB1 p.m39.gB3 p.m59.gA1 p.m79.gE4 p.m93.gE1 p.m107.gC1
p.m6.gB2 p.m39.gC3 p.m59.gA2 p.m79.gE5 p.m94.gC2 p.m107.gC2
p.m7.gB3 p.m40.gB4 p.m60.gA5 p.m80.gE5 p.m94.gD2 p.m107.gC3
p.m8.gB4 p.m40.gC4 p.m60.gA6 p.m80.gE6 p.m94.gE2 p.m108.gC2
p.m9.gB5 p.m41.gB5 p.m61.gB1 p.m81.gF1 p.m95.gC3 p.m108.gC3
p.m10.gB6 p.m41.gC5 p.m61.gB2 p.m81.gF2 p.m95.gD3 p.m108.gC4
p.m11.gC1 p.m42.gB6 p.m62.gB2 p.m82.gF5 p.m95.gE3 p.m109.gC3
p.m12.gC2 p.m42.gC6 p.m62.gB3 p.m82.gF6 p.m96.gC4 p.m109.gC4
p.m13.gC3 p.m43.gC1 p.m63.gB3 p.m83.gA1 p.m96.gD4 p.m109.gC5
p.m14.gC4 p.m43.gD1 p.m63.gB4 p.m83.gB1 p.m96.gE4 p.m110.gC4
p.m15.gC5 p.m44.gC2 p.m64.gB4 p.m83.gC1 p.m97.gC5 p.m110.gC5
p.m16.gC6 p.m44.gD2 p.m64.gB5 p.m84.gA2 p.m97.gD5 p.m110.gC6
p.m17.gD1 p.m45.gC3 p.m65.gB5 p.m84.gB2 p.m97.gE5 p.m111.gD1
p.m18.gD2 p.m45.gD3 p.m65.gB6 p.m84.gC2 p.m98.gC6 p.m111.gD2
p.m19.gD3 p.m46.gC4 p.m66.gC1 p.m85.gA5 p.m98.gD6 p.m111.gD3
p.m20.gD4 p.m46.gD4 p.m66.gC2 p.m85.gB5 p.m98.gE6 p.m112.gD2
p.m21.gD5 p.m47.gC5 p.m67.gC2 p.m85.gC5 p.m99.gD1 p.m112.gD3
p.m22.gD6 p.m47.gD5 p.m67.gC3 p.m86.gA6 p.m99.gE1 p.m112.gD4
p.m23.gE1 p.m48.gC6 p.m68.gC3 p.m86.gB6 p.m99.gF1 p.m113.gD3
p.m24.gE2 p.m48.gD6 p.m68.gC4 p.m86.gC6 p.m100.gD2 p.m113.gD4
p.m25.gE3 p.m49.gD1 p.m69.gC4 p.m87.gB1 p.m100.gE2 p.m113.gD5
p.m26.gE4 p.m49.gE1 p.m69.gC5 p.m87.gC1 p.m100.gF2 p.m114.gD4
p.m27.gE5 p.m50.gD2 p.m70.gC5 p.m87.gD1 p.m101.gD5 p.m114.gD5
p.m28.gE6 p.m50.gE2 p.m70.gC6 p.m88.gB2 p.m101.gE5 p.m114.gD6
p.m29.gF1 p.m51.gD3 p.m71.gD1 p.m88.gC2 p.m101.gF5 p.m115.gE1
p.m30.gF2 p.m51.gE3 p.m71.gD2 p.m88.gD2 p.m102.gD6 p.m115.gE2
p.m31.gF5 p.m52.gD4 p.m72.gD2 p.m89.gB3 p.m102.gE6 p.m115.gE3
p.m32.gF6 p.m52.gE4 p.m72.gD3 p.m89.gC3 p.m102.gF6 p.m116.gE2
p.m33.gA1 p.m53.gD5 p.m73.gD3 p.m89.gD3 p.m103.gB1 p.m116.gE3
p.m33.gB1 p.m53.gE5 p.m73.gD4 p.m90.gB4 p.m103.gB2 p.m116.gE4
p.m34.gA2 p.m54.gD6 p.m74.gD4 p.m90.gC4 p.m103.gB3 p.m117.gE3
p.m34.gB2 p.m54.gE6 p.m74.gD5 p.m90.gD4 p.m104.gB2 p.m117.gE4
p.m35.gA5 p.m55.gE1 p.m75.gD5 p.m91.gB5 p.m104.gB3 p.m117.gE5
p.m35.gB5 p.m55.gF1 p.m75.gD6 p.m91.gC5 p.m104.gB4 p.m118.gE4
p.m36.gA6 p.m56.gE2 p.m76.gE1 p.m91.gD5 p.m105.gB3 p.m118.gE5
p.m36.gB6 p.m56.gF2 p.m76.gE2 p.m92.gB6 p.m105.gB4 p.m118.gE6
G pm  (for all p in P)
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p.m119.gA1 p.m132.gD3 p.m145.gC5 p.m159.gB1 p.m172.gD2 p.m185.gC6
p.m119.gA2 p.m132.gE2 p.m146.gB5 p.m159.gA2 p.m172.gE2 p.m186.gC1
p.m119.gB1 p.m133.gD3 p.m146.gC5 p.m159.gB2 p.m173.gE2 p.m186.gC2
p.m120.gA5 p.m133.gD4 p.m146.gC6 p.m160.gB4 p.m173.gD3 p.m186.gD2
p.m120.gA6 p.m133.gE3 p.m147.gC1 p.m160.gA5 p.m173.gE3 p.m187.gC2
p.m120.gB5 p.m134.gD4 p.m147.gD1 p.m160.gB5 p.m174.gE3 p.m187.gC3
p.m121.gB1 p.m134.gD5 p.m147.gD2 p.m161.gB5 p.m174.gD4 p.m187.gD3
p.m121.gB2 p.m134.gE4 p.m148.gC2 p.m161.gA6 p.m174.gE4 p.m188.gC3
p.m121.gC1 p.m135.gD5 p.m148.gD2 p.m161.gB6 p.m175.gE4 p.m188.gC4
p.m122.gB2 p.m135.gD6 p.m148.gD3 p.m162.gC1 p.m175.gD5 p.m188.gD4
p.m122.gB3 p.m135.gE5 p.m149.gC3 p.m162.gB2 p.m175.gE5 p.m189.gC4
p.m122.gC2 p.m136.gE1 p.m149.gD3 p.m162.gC2 p.m176.gE5 p.m189.gC5
p.m123.gB3 p.m136.gE2 p.m149.gD4 p.m163.gC2 p.m176.gD6 p.m189.gD5
p.m123.gB4 p.m136.gF1 p.m150.gC4 p.m163.gB3 p.m176.gE6 p.m190.gC5
p.m123.gC3 p.m137.gE2 p.m150.gD4 p.m163.gC3 p.m177.gF1 p.m190.gC6
p.m124.gB4 p.m137.gE3 p.m150.gD5 p.m164.gC3 p.m177.gE2 p.m190.gD6
p.m124.gB5 p.m137.gF2 p.m151.gC5 p.m164.gB4 p.m177.gF2 p.m191.gD1
p.m124.gC4 p.m138.gE5 p.m151.gD5 p.m164.gC4 p.m178.gF5 p.m191.gD2
p.m125.gB5 p.m138.gE6 p.m151.gD6 p.m165.gC4 p.m178.gE6 p.m191.gE2
p.m125.gB6 p.m138.gF5 p.m152.gD1 p.m165.gB5 p.m178.gF6 p.m192.gD2
p.m125.gC5 p.m139.gA1 p.m152.gE1 p.m165.gC5 p.m179.gA1 p.m192.gD3
p.m126.gC1 p.m139.gB1 p.m152.gE2 p.m166.gC5 p.m179.gA2 p.m192.gE3
p.m126.gC2 p.m139.gB2 p.m153.gD2 p.m166.gB6 p.m179.gB2 p.m193.gD3
p.m126.gD1 p.m140.gA2 p.m153.gE2 p.m166.gC6 p.m180.gA5 p.m193.gD4
p.m127.gC2 p.m140.gB2 p.m153.gE3 p.m167.gD1 p.m180.gA6 p.m193.gE4
p.m127.gC3 p.m140.gB3 p.m154.gD3 p.m167.gC2 p.m180.gB6 p.m194.gD4
p.m127.gD2 p.m141.gA5 p.m154.gE3 p.m167.gD2 p.m181.gB1 p.m194.gD5
p.m128.gC3 p.m141.gB5 p.m154.gE4 p.m168.gD2 p.m181.gB2 p.m194.gE5
p.m128.gC4 p.m141.gB6 p.m155.gD4 p.m168.gC3 p.m181.gC2 p.m195.gD5
p.m128.gD3 p.m142.gB1 p.m155.gE4 p.m168.gD3 p.m182.gB2 p.m195.gD6
p.m129.gC4 p.m142.gC1 p.m155.gE5 p.m169.gD3 p.m182.gB3 p.m195.gE6
p.m129.gC5 p.m142.gC2 p.m156.gD5 p.m169.gC4 p.m182.gC3 p.m196.gE1
p.m129.gD4 p.m143.gB2 p.m156.gE5 p.m169.gD4 p.m183.gB3 p.m196.gE2
p.m130.gC5 p.m143.gC2 p.m156.gE6 p.m170.gD4 p.m183.gB4 p.m196.gF2
p.m130.gC6 p.m143.gC3 p.m157.gE1 p.m170.gC5 p.m183.gC4 p.m197.gE4
p.m130.gD5 p.m144.gB3 p.m157.gF1 p.m170.gD5 p.m184.gB4 p.m197.gE5
p.m131.gD1 p.m144.gC3 p.m157.gF2 p.m171.gD5 p.m184.gB5 p.m197.gF5
p.m131.gD2 p.m144.gC4 p.m158.gE5 p.m171.gC6 p.m184.gC5 p.m198.gE5
p.m131.gE1 p.m145.gB4 p.m158.gF5 p.m171.gD6 p.m185.gB5 p.m198.gE6
p.m132.gD2 p.m145.gC4 p.m158.gF6 p.m172.gE1 p.m185.gB6 p.m198.gF6




dist g teth_range p'' r psg
gA1 25 Helo1 10.0 Surf1.active Helo1.active SSN1.passive SSN1.active
gA2 20 gA1 0.42 0.5 0.45 0.63
gA3 15 trans p gA2 0.42 0.5 0.45 0.63
gA4 15 Surf1  0.5 gA3 0.56 0.67 0.6 0.84
gA5 15 Helo1  0.1 gA4 0.7 0.84 0.75 1.05
gA6 15 SSN1  0.7 gA5 0.91 1.09 0.97 1.36
gB1 20 gA6 0.95 1.14 1.02 1.43
gB2 15 gB1 0.42 0.5 0.45 0.63
gB3 10 gB2 0.49 0.59 0.53 0.74
gB4 10 gB3 0.56 0.67 0.6 0.84
gB5 10 gB4 0.7 0.84 0.75 1.05
gB6 10 gB5 0.88 1.05 0.94 1.32
gC1 20 gB6 1.03 1.24 1.11 1.55
gC2 15 gC1 0.56 0.67 0.6 0.84
gC3 10 gC2 0.63 0.76 0.68 0.95
gC4 5 gC3 0.7 0.84 0.75 1.05
gC5 5 gC4 0.84 1.01 0.9 1.26
gC6 5 gC5 0.91 1.1 0.98 1.37
gD1 20 gC6 0.97 1.16 1.03 1.45
gD2 15 gD1 0.91 1.09 0.98 1.37
gD3 10 gD2 1.01 1.22 1.08 1.52
gD4 5 gD3 0.77 0.92 0.83 1.16
gD5 0 gD4 0.63 0.76 0.68 0.95
gD6 5 gD5 0.7 0.84 0.75 1.05
gE1 20 gD6 0.7 0.84 0.75 1.05
gE2 15 gE1 0.99 1.19 1.06 1.48
gE3 10 gE2 1.03 1.24 1.1 1.55
gE4 5 gE3 0.63 0.76 0.68 0.95
gE5 5 gE4 0.49 0.59 0.53 0.74
gE6 5 gE5 0.56 0.67 0.6 0.84
gF1 20 gE6 0.56 0.67 0.6 0.84
gF2 15 gF1 0.95 1.14 1.02 1.43
gF3 10 gF2 0.88 1.05 0.94 1.31
gF4 10 gF3 0.56 0.67 0.6 0.84
gF5 10 gF4 0.42 0.5 0.45 0.63
gF6 10 gF5 0.42 0.5 0.45 0.63
gF6 0.42 0.5 0.45 0.63
These data are identical to Example One:
range m'm''  
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